The Islamic State (ISIL/ISIS): Religion, Recruiting, and Resistance

Video from VOX: "Syria's War: Who is Fighting and Why"
The recent attacks in Paris, France have thrust the Islamic State (ISIL/ISIS/IS) back into the spotlight. The topics of terrorism, the Syrian conflict, and the Islamic State are something I have both covered in great depth in recent years and have been focused on for a while. I have yet to coalesce all of my various works into a single readily accessible format, so here is my attempt. I have included relevant portions from each work, but I encourage you to read the full works in their entirety. I hope this will strengthen your understanding on the subject matter.

Lone Wolf Terrorism in a 'New Kind of War':

"The solitary nature of a lone-wolf terrorist attack is strategically problematic for law enforcement entities. When a group or cell conspires to plan a hostile terrorist act, the way to infiltrate and disrupt the plot is by finding the weakest link in the chain. Accomplishing this process becomes increasingly difficult as the network becomes smaller in size. Less people involved means less communication – if there is only a single person, possibly compromising communications are virtually eliminated. Lone wolf terrorism has emerged as the new face of violent terrorist attacks. The solitary nature of the attackers helps to isolate their plans from incursion by law enforcement or intelligence analysts. These attacks can be sudden, grievous, and often times happen without warning. Thus, finally figuring out how to preemptively combat this issue is of great importance."

[Excerpt from "U.S. Counterintelligence & Lone Wolf Terrorism: The Evolving Approach to Combat an Emerging Threat" written in 2012. Read more Here (PDF)]

Theological Justifications in Extremist Ideologies:

"The justifications used by extremist organizations will be exposed for what they are: nationalistic and not theological. The basis for their ideologies is an appeal to Islamic scripture. In order to illuminate the specific arguments or underlying themes, a survey of relevant scripture will  be included and scrutinized. [and ]As demonstrated, when examined in realist terms a la Pape’s CPOST Study, the explanation for martyrdom and resistance become separated from Islamic theology. If the West becomes educated on the multifaceted issue of suicide terrorism, they would see Islam is not some inherent threat. Yes, this – or any – religion can be co-opted,  but nothing makes Islamic theology inherently more deadly than Christianity or Judaism."

[Excerpt from "Martyrdom and the Afterlife in Islam: Analyzing Theological Justifications in Extremist Ideologies" written in 2013. Read more Here (html) or Here (PDF)]

Inside the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM):

"The U.S.’s tier one fighting force is known as United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The purpose of USSOCOM is to “Provide fully capable SpecialOperations Forces to defend the United States and its interests [and to] Synchronize planning of global operations against terrorist networks." After 9/11, U.S. Special Forces had to switch gears and operate within a radical new framework. What resulted from this shift was an overhaul of how military and intelligence agencies were structured. Interagency cooperation between civilian and military agencies was increased, while redundancies were reduced. With no allegiances to a flag or a state, the new enemy aligned with ideas and personalities. The global playing field switched from state actors to insurgencies, transnational revolutionaries, and civilian combatants."

[Excerpt from "USSOCOM: Firefights & Finances" written in 2012. Read more Here (html) or Here (PDF)]

The Responsibility to Protect and the Syrian Uprising:

"The Syrian regime has been unapologetic in every endeavor of the uprising. The man in power, Bashar al-Assad, is a strong-armed authoritarian dictator. His political ideology is rooted in the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party. Over 40 years of brutal repression in Syria helped to shape the fervent anti-Assad sentiments in the conflict zones. Just as the tyranny increased, the denizens’ willingness to tolerate it decreased. With Russia continuing to threaten to veto any Security Council resolutions condemning the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, the realization that diplomacy is often a stall tactic is not hard to grasp. Any delay in the UN deliberations that Russia could help to facilitate via veto power prolonged the conflict in Syria. Russia’s long term interests in Syria were established prior to the uprising, but an analysis of the current scenario yields a chilling understanding. Since the Syrian government was utilizing regular military troops to conduct operations on civilian targets, the resources being used to execute these missions – small arms, tanks, and artillery -  were also Russian supplied. As it currently stands, the bloody struggle in Syria is ongoing despite multilateral ceasefire talks. Even though Syria has used and implemented the prototypical style of a mass atrocity military campaign, no external force has yet to intervene militarily or humanitarianly."

[Excerpt from "The Syrian Uprising: The Responsibility to Protect & The Failure of Conflict Cessation" written in 2012. Read more Here (PDF)]

Analyzing the History, Recruiting Techniques, and Social Media of the Islamic State:

"The Levant continues to be rife with conflict and destabilizing violence. The largest draw to the region is the enticement of Islamic State via their recruiting efforts through social media and video productions. Islamic State started with the migration of regional al-Qaeda affiliated foreign fighters arriving to fight in the Syrian Civil War. Islamic State has quite a sophisticated media production division and their social media efforts are just as relentless. Each video released by the Islamic State has its own unique message and substance while still adhering to a coherent message. The commonalities in recruiting efforts between the U.S. Armed Forces and the Islamic State are numerous. Coincidentally, the intent of recruiting in both organizations are also similar in nature on a main point: Islamic State’s campaign to recruit fighters to volunteer to leave their homes to fight on foreign soil mirrors the U.S. Armed Forces recruiting campaign to likewise find volunteers to leave their homes to fight on foreign soil. Just as there is a large emphasis on counterterrorism in America and the Global North, so too should there be a more active counter- propaganda agency to combat the spread of Islamic State ideology via soft power methods."

[Excerpt from "What Are We Fighting For? How Islamic State Uses United States Armed Forces Recruiting Methods to Mobilize Foreign Fighters in a Struggle for the New Caliphate" written in 2015. Read more Here (html) or Here (PDF)]

How Soft Power Policy Failed to 'Destroy or Degrade' the Islamic State:

"Although the military advance of IS across the Levant region have been nearly unimpeded, efforts have been launched to resolve the regional conflict outside the context of a military intervention. The UN has attempted to bring about conflict cessation through conflict mediators, regional forces such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan have used a mix of military and non-lethal support, and grassroots efforts have been deployed on a local level. Nonviolent peacebuilding efforts implicitly rely on good faith measures from all  parties involved. Prior to IS seizing control, the Syrian regime was the sole coercive force in the Syrian regions. he use of soft power to combat the influence and advance of IS in Syria and Iraq has been met with increased barbarity and continued bloodshed. Relief efforts and non-lethal assistance has been delivered to the denizens of IS controlled territories in Syria and Iraq. However, the use of diplomacy, nonviolent peacebuilding, and humanitarian aid is a currency which IS refuses to trade in. While conflict cessation or the reduction of IS control cannot be achieved by soft power or nonviolent methods of peacebuilding, the key to a lasting calm beyond the reign of IS certainly lies in these approaches."

[Excerpt from "An Analysis of Promoting Peace in a Realist Conflict: Non-Violent Attempts to Destroy & Degrade the Islamic State (IS)" written in 2015. Read more Here (html) or Here (PDF)]

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What Are We Fighting For? How Islamic State uses U.S. Armed Forces Recruiting Methods to Mobilize Foreign Fighters

My latest term at Conrad Grebel University College for my Master of Peace and Conflict Studies (MPACS) graduate programme has been long and arduous. The focus of my studies have been on the multifaceted nature of Islamic State. Drawing on course themes, I have analyzed Islamic State through many different perspectives. Previously, I wrote a paper on "The Failure of Soft Power to Destroy or Degrade Islamic State". The following article is an analysis of Islamic State and their unprecedented recruiting campaign, specifically in their use of social media and their target audience of foreign fighters.

(Here is an Academia.edu link for a .PDF version)

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Note of Process and Terminology

          Media outlets, politicians, academics, and denizens of Islamic State controlled territory have referred to this organization as ‘Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham’ or ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’ – ISIS, ‘Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’ – ISIL, and/or ‘ad-Dawlah al-Islamiyah fil-Iraq wash-Sham’ – DAESH. In the context of this report, ‘Islamic State’ will be uniformly used throughout for the name of the group in question. The geographic region known as the ‘Levant’ will be understood to include the modern nations of Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, and Lebanon. Any comments on or portrayal of Islam or its theology will be representative of Islamic State ideology and is in no way representative of true or mainstream Islamic thought.[1] In addition, when Arabic or Islamic elements are described, they will be transliterated from Arabic to English using a simplified phonetic spelling. References to the United States Armed Forces in comparison to Islamic State are in no way meant to be defamatory or critical. Any comparisons are made for that singular specific juxtaposition and do not extend in scope beyond what is described therein.

Introduction

          The Levant continues to be rife with conflict and destabilizing violence. The most recent conflict to strike the region started in spring 2011 as the Syrian Uprising – and has since metastasized into the Syrian Civil War. The death toll from the ongoing conflict ranges from a United Nations (UN) estimated 220,000 to a Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) estimated 310,000.[2] [3] Amidst the chaos of a conflicted region were the waning hours of an American combat operation, Operation Iraqi Freedom, in Iraq. The United States Armed Forces decision to withdraw combat troops in Iraq by December of 2011 left an immense power vacuum in the still destabilized Levant region. Emboldened by Western and American inaction, the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad continued its brutal military crackdown on opposition movements within Syria’s borders. In response to the Assad regime’s offensives against civilian neighbourhoods, resistance forces began fighting back against regime security forces and likewise aligned paramilitary militias. The subsequent eruption of open conflict flooded the region with what has been described as “the largest foreign fighter mobilization since the Afghan conflict in the 1980’s”, by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR).[4]

          The largest draw to the region is the enticement of Islamic State via their recruiting efforts through social media and video productions. Islamic State started with the migration of regional al-Qaeda affiliated foreign fighters arriving to fight in the Syrian Civil War. According to a February 2015 assessment by the United States Intelligence Community, the number of foreign nationals fighting for Islamic State are estimated at 20,00 to 31,500, with 3,400 coming from nations in the Global North.[5] United States Secretary of State John Kerry suggests that the target demographic for Islamic State recruiting are “[those] among the disaffected and disenfranchised, but also among those of all backgrounds on a misguided quest for meaning and empowerment”.[6] Islamic State is able to successfully connect with their target audience via “the power of modern communications”, as described by CIA Director John Brennan:

“New technologies can help groups like [Islamic State] coordinate operations, attract new recruits, disseminate propaganda, and inspire sympathizers across the globe to act in their name.”[7]

Islamic State has a candidate pool and the means to contact them, but potential and ability alone do not automatically convert into actually recruiting foreigners. The underlying issues described by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry are not new phenomenon in the Global North, especially regarding those who are first or second generation immigrants from outsider countries.

The most prominent societal issues are often predicated on institutionalized racism and discrimination. The resurgence of extreme right-wing political movements in Europe has lately exacerbated those factors. The recent economic slumps that hit the Global North have further marginalized already isolated non-Caucasian demographics. Lastly, the desire for adventure, belonging, and empowerment is a strong urge that transcends ethnic or religious divisions. Alienation from western society experienced in their own countries of residence is a key force for potential radicalization. Much like how America constantly reaffirms its national identity through hypernationalism and uniting against an enemy of the other, so too has Islamic State fashioned its ideological foundation. Understanding their target audience for supporters, Islamic State crafted their recruiting message to reflect the unique nature of their group, leading to an unprecedented mobilization campaign of foreign fighters devoted to fight and die for their newly created state.

The Rise of Islamic State Ranks[8]

          Islamic State began with an estimated 5,291 foreign fighters, of which 1,626 were from nations in the Global North, as of late 2013.[9] Since Islamic State’s rise to prominence, their number of foreign fighters, as of February 2015, increased to an NCTC estimated 20,000 fighters with roughly 3,400 of those fighters coming from nations in the Global North.[10] Although Islamic State began as a semi-autonomous al-Qaeda affiliate group, in February 2014 “al-Qaeda’s central leadership announced that it had severed ties with” Islamic State due to their excessively brutal and unforgiving tactics to Muslims and non-Muslims alike.[11] In June of 2014, in the midst of their aggressive military campaign, the American supported Iraqi military largely crumbled under the advance of Islamic State fighters, resulting in the capture of Mosul, an Iraqi city with the population of over 1 million residents.[12] Islamic State quickly took control of major cities in Eastern Syria and Northern Iraq, while in the process accruing fiscal assets, estimated to be around the “$2 billion (USD)” mark.[13]

          The current leader of Islamic State is Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, whose duties include military command, spiritual leadership, and acting as the group’s public face. Al-Baghdadi is an Iraqi-born Salafist Sunni Muslim with a claimed PhD. in Islamic Studies and alleged ties of descendancy to the Prophet Mohamed’s Quraysh tribe.[14] Al-Baghdadi was detained by U.S. Armed Forces as a civilian during Operation Iraqi Freedom, was jailed by the Iraqi government from 2005 to 2010, and placed on a UN Security Council (UNSC) “Al-Qaida and associated individuals” sanctions list on 15 August 2014.[15] Al-Baghdadi is an enigmatic figure that is rarely seen in the public eye. During one of al-Baghdadi’s rare public appearances he gave a speech to mark the creation of Islamic State, humbly saying to Islamic State fighters and denizens of the Iraqi city of Mosul that "I am not better than you or more virtuous than you".[16]

          Al-Baghdadi’s public appearance followed an online document release that outlined the aims of Islamic State:

“[the] legality of all emirates, groups, states, and organizations, becomes null by the expansion of [Islamic State’s] authority and arrival of its troops to their areas…We [Islamic State fighters] spilled rivers of our blood to water the seeds of [Islamic State], laid its foundation with our skulls, and built its tower over our corpses… It is the state for the Muslims – the oppressed of them, the orphans, the widows, and the impoverished.”[17]

The document was a well formatted ten-page .PDF transcript released in Arabic, as well as translated into four languages - English, Russian, French, and German. The manifesto laid out a bold design for what Islamic State aimed to achieve and represent. While the aggressive verbosity of the document was defended with lines from the Koran and Hadith, the tone of the message echoed the Machiavellian maxim that, for the leader of a kingdom, “it is much safer to be feared than loved, if one has to lack one of the two.”[18] Unlike Hezbollah’s foundation in 1985 and Osama Bin Laden’s Fatwas in 1996 and 1998, in which both appeal to the Ummah, Arabic for “Islamic Community”, and still operate within the dialectic of international relations, Islamic State appeals to the Ummah, while conversely rejecting the current existence of state borders, national identities, and religious denominations.

Islamic State Social Media

          Islamic State social media efforts are bold and continuous in their outreach efforts. The ability to interact instantaneously on an international scale has been heavily employed by Islamic State. Different social media platforms serve different purposes in their design: Facebook is meant for more personal interactions with a fairly limited social circle and is heavily regulated in regards to what sort of content can be posted, YouTube is the world’s most popular streaming video website and features moderate content restriction, and Twitter is meant for instantaneous and immediate communication with minimal content restrictions. Additionally, while all three of those social media websites have reporting processes for questionable or objectionable content, Twitter is the least reactive in prosecuting content removal. Hence, the most popular social media platform, for Islamic State supporters and fighters alike, is Twitter.

          Islamic State has quite a sophisticated media production division and their social media efforts are just as relentless. The media produced by Islamic State is of no usable value unless it can be broadcast to the world. Islamic State supporters have learned how to exploit the mechanics behind Twitter to positive effect. Using the ‘trends’ mechanism in Twitter’s coding, Islamic State supporter use what are known as hashtags to promote a singular identifier even in the absence of an official Islamic State Twitter account. Additionally, Islamic State supporters will often coopt regional or worldwide trends and tag Islamic State messaging with arbitrary tags in order to increase that tweet’s exposure – such as #AaronHernandezTrial, #LillyforTarget, and #StanleyCupPlayoffs. Those topics have nothing to do with Islamic State, but people who click on those tags are taken to a central page that aggregates all tweets with that tagged phrase. In a similar fashion, the tag of #baqiyah, baqiyah is Arabic for “it will remain”, is used by Islamic State supporters.[19] Going to the Twitter webpage that aggregates content with the #baqiyah tag reveals the variety of Islamic State supporters as well as the range of to what extent users declare their support. The accounts that are the most fervent and verbose in their support for Islamic State are suspended without the ability to appeal. The more subtle Islamic State supporters will often post tweets with double entendres, innuendos, vague messaging, and religious proclamations.

          Reliable data on the subject of Islamic State is hard to come by. In the realm where a person can pretend to be anybody or even an automated bot can emulate a person, the Internet can be a deceptive arena for data collection. The best estimates of pro-Islamic State Twitter users comes from a March 2015 Brookings Institute research report. The study estimated with, with over 90% confidence, that the “total number of overt [Islamic State] supporter account on Twitter [is] 46,000”.[20] They speculated that upwards of 90,000 accounts could be Islamic State supporters, while each account surveyed averaged 2,219 tweets over 1,004 followers.[21] The majority of Islamic State supporter accounts on Twitter “were created in response to the suspensions, either to replace accounts that had been taken down, or as backup accounts to hedge against future suspensions”.[22] The majority of Islamic State supporter account were created in 2014 (59.51%), while just 1.3% were created prior to 2011.[23] The report also noted that the top five countries for the Islamic State were Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq, U.S.A., and Egypt.[24] The preferred smartphone platform for Islamic State supporters is Android based (69%), with Apple (30%) and Blackberry (1%) following.[25]

          The democratized platform of social media has also presented a few challenges to Islamic State’s public image of battle hardened and disciplined warriors. With the ability to post instantaneously and independently, Islamic State fighters on the actual battlefields in Iraq and Syria can post whatever content or imagery they please. Often times Islamic State fighters post selfies on the frontlines or graphic images after a victory in battle. However, there are instances where Islamic State fighters have posted cell-phone video showing amateur mistakes with weapons handling, explosives manufacturing, or other assorted moments of failure. In response to one of Islamic State’s graphic videos, Internet users compiled all of the video clips of Islamic State fighters making mistakes and failing spectacularly into one video. The edited video shows events like “one fighter blow[ing] himself up when his rocket launcher backfires, another accidentally shoot[ing] a comrade with a machine gun… and [another] mistakenly detonates a bomb during a group photograph”.[26] In some instances social media users have even openly mocked Islamic State movements by humorously parodying their violent threats. In February 2015, Islamic State created the hashtag “#We_Are_Coming_O_Rome” to declare their aim for the center of the Western Christian world. Italian Twitter users responded by warning Islamic State fighters of the perils of rush hour traffic, unreliable public transport, and dysfunctional Italian government.[27]

          Islamic State has publicly acknowledge the importance of a proper social media policy, as stated by Abu Bakr al Janabi, an Islamic State official, in a VICE News interview:

“Social media is good for building a network of connections and recruitment… Fighters talk about experiences in battle and encourage people to rise, and supporters defend and translate ISIS statements.”[28]

Even corporations recognize that the key to increasing public exposure and earned profits is through social media, as spending on social media as a part of marketing is expected to grow upwards of 128% in the next five years.[29] Through a comprehensive and mostly coordinates social media policy, Islamic State “is able to project strength and promote engagement online”.[30] Islamic State has made a name for itself in regards to their ruthless military tactics and continuing violence, but their use of social media as an outreach and recruiting tool has been similarly successful to their overall growth.

Islamic State Media Production

          Islamic State media production is a multi-faceted propaganda and recruiting factory. The main arm of Islamic State media production is Al Hayat Media Center.[31] Al-Hayat is Arabic for ‘The Life’ and Islamic State coopted the name from a well known newspaper in the Arab world. As mentioned before, Islamic State affiliated social media accounts are frequently suspended or deleted, resulting in a lack of a single stable official social media account. The social media accounts operated by Al Hayat were promptly suspended by Twitter in the weeks after the Islamic State began to regularly publish videos. Outside of the realm of social media platforms is where Al Hayat Media Center is able to maintain a stable publication base via ‘isdarat.org’. Isdarat is Arabic for ‘Publish’ or ‘Spread’ and currently serves as the single fixed point for Islamic State’s internet presence. Islamic State also demonstrates technical knowledge in how they operate their website’s domain rights. The domain address for isdarat.org is registered to a protected and obscured registrar who holds the domain rights until January 2016.[32] The features of the website include a media archive for Islamic State videos and articles, a ‘frequently asked questions’ (FAQ) page, a feedback comments page, and separate page filters for the different geographic territories in which Islamic State is present. While the HTML design of isdarat.org is fairly basic, the overall web product is polished and comprehensive. In addition to isdarat.org, Islamic State uses Dabiq, an online English language magazine. Dabiq is a reference to the name of a Syrian city mentioned in the Hadith in reference to the end-times or the ‘Last Hour’.[33] Keeping the same style of Islamic symbolism, Islamic State purposefully chose Dabiq to fit the themes and motifs of their justification for an Islamic Caliphate.

          Islamic State uses isdarat.org as its main broadcast hub to publish Al Hayat Media Center’s video productions. Through navigating the website a visitor can easily find links to the third-party hosting mirrors for Islamic State videos. The pursuit of video files often leads to the discovery of broken URL links and the removal of hosted files. Access to these files are notoriously dubious, often coming from disreputable sources or questionable content hosts. Attempts by Islamic State to have their video content hosted on YouTube is met with minimal success, often staying active for only a few hours before the video is taken down and the associated account is terminated. Nevertheless, Islamic State has still been able to devise a method for hosting accessible media content by encrypting their uploaded files via password, obscuring the filenames, and utilizing third-party file hosts that even offer quick connection speeds with up to 8.3Mbps download rates.[34] Islamic State publishes video content on a fairly regular basis, with eight major video productions that standout above the rest.

          The first two Islamic State video releases were in relatively quick succession to each other: their first, “There is No Life without Jihad”, was released on 19 June 2014 and is 13 minutes and 16 seconds long, while their second, “The End of Sykes-Picot” was released on 29 June 2014 and is 15 minutes and 4 seconds long.[35] These two videos serve as an important foundation for the way Islamic State is represented in the digital world. While these first two videos had yet to feature the high value production and sleek editing synonymous with the latest Islamic State video releases, they still outlined two major components of Islamic State ideology. The “There is No Life without Jihad” video features exclusively English-speaking foreign fighters from countries such as Australia, U.K., Cambodia, and Bangladesh. In a clearly unscripted fashion, the men extoll the virtue of sacrificing one’s family and material possessions in the Western World to wage Jihad in order to implement the law of Allah. The “The End of Sykes-Picot” video features a Chilean Islamic State fighter giving a historical geography lesson and declaring the Sykes-Picot mandated borders in Asia Minor to be dissolved. The point is reiterated as the narrator mocks the dispossessed Iraqi Army before parading prisoners of war in front of the camera and avowing that Islamic State will strive to break more borders. While these videos are basic in their editing technique and production value, there still exists a clear narrative behind the purpose of these two videos.

          On 19 September 2014, Islamic State released the video “Flames of War”, their longest video at 55 minutes and 11 seconds. The message of “Flames of War” frames the mission aims of Islamic State by providing theological justifications for their ideology. The video flashes between passages from the Koran and Hadith overlaid on scenes of Islamic State fighting battles in Iraq and Syria. The video’s narrator states that the purpose of fighting on behalf of Islamic State is for “Allah, not land, but the [Islamic] Caliphate.”[36] The end of the video shows purported Assad regime soldiers digging their own graves while, under duress, one man makes the claim that “it’s as if Allah has blessed the Islamic State” because “ten or twenty or thirty [Islamic State fighters] captured the base when it had 800 soldiers.”[37] The videos narrator then declares the fighting has only just begun.

          Islamic State also released a series of videos showing the executions of Western journalists, aid workers, and a Jordanian fighter pilot. While Islamic State videos often feature mass executions by firing squad or beheadings, these videos strike a different tone as they are singular executions of high profile persons. The Jordanian fighter pilot execution video marked a distinct change in Islamic State video productions. The 22 minute and 34 second video released on 3 February 2015 opens with an intricate use of detailed computer-generated graphics and geographical schematics highlighted with news clips of U.S. President Barack Obama and the King of Jordan Abdullah II. The intricate digital renderings depict the Jordanian pilot’s strike sortie over Islamic State targets, while the Pilot is made to confess his guilt and wrongdoing. The video is primarily in Arabic and is directed at the immediate regional opponents of Islamic State. The video garnered widespread media attention for featuring the execution of the Jordanian pilot by being set on fire with gasoline while trapped in a metal cage. In previous videos, the Islamic State fighters wore military attire, but they were mismatched and assorted patterns – forest and desert camouflage fatigues are not meant for desert combat. This time the Islamic State fighters are shown in uniformed military attire – desert sand camouflage – while in a straight formation, postured in the same rigid manner, and even equipped with the same model of firearm. The depiction of Islamic State fighters in this video is a stark contrast to the fighters in previous videos, as the fighters now look like a professional military force. Islamic State continued with the depiction of military imagery in their next video release, showing their version of Boot Camp with various training exercises and a column of fleet vehicles dawning the Islamic State Black Standard. While the video is the shortest release at 2 minutes and 9 seconds, the imagery of the fighter training video builds upon the themes of the Jordanian fighter pilot video. However, the video features fairly low production value and was mocked by military veterans who analyzed the video.

          Islamic State shifted direction in their, as of yet, penultimate and antepenultimate video releases. Executions have been a significant component of Islamic State videos, but in these two videos the executions are the central focus. The third to last video purports to show the execution of an ‘Israeli spy’ and is 3 minutes and 17 seconds long. The execution is carried out by a young boy, probably not even sixteen years-old, shooting the prisoner in the face with a Glock pistol. The execution is captured with multiple, simultaneous camera angles and in slow motion as well. Post production effects add dramatic thematic elements to the video and colour correction effects are used to emphasize the blood and gore on the dying prisoner. The second to last video titled “Strike Their Necks” is also centered around an execution featuring youth fighters and is 4 minutes and 15 seconds long. The similar editing elements from the previous video are present here, but the method of execution was instead beheading. The executioners are dressed in the now standard desert camouflage uniforms from the Jordanian fighter pilot video. Multiple camera angles likewise capture the blood and gore in an intensely graphic fashion, ultimately showing a collective flow of blood flowing into a collective pool.

          The most recent Islamic State video, released on 19 April 2015, titled “Until There Came to Them Clear Evidence” is a 29 minute and 20 second video production in Arabic, but was published with the options of English, Russian, French, and German subtitles. The video opens with scripture from the Koran and Hadith describing the theological justification and subsequent requirements of Jizyah – the compulsion of taxation on those ‘People of the Book’, Jews and Christians, who choose to not convert to Islam. After a long introduction from one of Islamic State’s religious advisors, video testimony of non-Sunni Muslim denizens in Islamic State controlled testimony is shown. Those in the video begin to proclaim the fair and just practices of Islamic State and how their rule is more equitable than either the Syrian or Iraqi governments. The video extolls the virtue of the Islamic society built by the Islamic State. The consequences for failing to submit to the enforcement of Jizyah are shown by Islamic State fighters destroying Christian churches in the region with sledge hammers and vandalism. The conclusion of this video is purported to be in Libya and shows Christian prisoners lined up in front of a firing squad. The narrator frames the issue as “battle between faith and blasphemy, between truth and falsehood”.[38] The final scenes show two mass executions of 21 African Christians, half by firing squad and the other half by decapitation.

          Each video released by the Islamic State has its own unique message and substance while still adhering to a coherent message. The subject of each major video production is unique, but certain aspects are repeated throughout each video. The beginning of each video reads “Bismillah ir-Rahman ir-raheem”, Arabic for “In the name of God, the most gracious, the most merciful. Each video is also watermarked in a top corner with an animated Black Standard of the Islamic State flapping in the wind. The vernacular of foreign Islamic State fighters in the videos is a unique blend of their primary language, usually English or French, and Arabic phrases. The speakers in the video, whether foreign or from the Levant, most frequently punctuate their dialogue with “Inshallah”, Arabic for ‘God Willing’, “Wallahi”, Arabic for ‘Swear by God’, and “Alhamdulillah”, Arabic for ‘Praise be to God’.

The production efforts of Islamic State are intricate and detailed, which certainly translates in their video releases. Their cinematographic body of work shows clear improvement in multiple aspects, including scripted dialogue, choreography, quality of audio and video capture, costume design, body language, computer generated graphics, and overall production value. Islamic State and Al Hayat Media Center have successfully allocated qualified talent to relevant media production positions. The videos released by Islamic State are graphic in nature, but do not contain boring or disinteresting elements. Since their rise to prominence in the Summer months of 2014, Islamic State has been a permanent fixture in the Western media news cycle. Whether on television or imbedded on news websites, the video news reports feature heavy use of the videos published by Islamic State. Attention to detail and investment in media creation have bolstered the official image of Islamic State in the eyes of the general public, as well as those in the potential Islamic State fighter candidate pool.

American Military Recruiting and Social Media

          After the end of the first Iraq War, Operation Desert Storm, in 1991 the U.S. Armed Forces faced a recruiting slump and a declining enlistment in the nation’s all volunteer military. To combat the recruiting slump the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) commissioned a research assessment from the RAND Corporation. The 2001 RAND report on military recruiting assessed the current factors in declining recruitment and recommended that the DoD should “consider additional marketing strategies and enlistment options” to correct the issue.[39] In response, the DoD launched an aggressive television advertising campaign across the branches of the U.S., even enlisting the help of the major advertising firm Campbell-Ewald to help with recruiting messaging.[40] The new content created for recruiting demonstrated an increase and production value, the use of digital graphics, and directed messaging to the target recruiting pool. The classic motifs of “service or duty or patriotism or some potential long-term benefit” were minimized in favour of being “all about the experience” instead.[41] The shift in messaging and design, initiated by the 2001 aim to increase recruiting, has had a lasting effect through current military recruiting efforts.

          The U.S. Navy was the most conspicuous in regards to the call for increased recruitment advertising. Their “Accelerate You Life” campaign featured video clips that incorporated heavy metal music riffs, fast-cut editing, and a narrator asking the watcher “If someone wrote a book about your life, would anyone want to read it?”[42] The U.S. Army, the largest branch of the U.S. Armed Forces, also launched renewed efforts with their “Army of One” and, later, “Army Strong” advertising campaigns. After the outset of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) military recruiting campaign advertisements were a mainstay of American television. The latest iteration of a U.S. Armed Forces recruiting campaign is the U.S. Air Force’s “Aim High” messaging. The primary campaign video is a mix of thematic music, military footage of aircraft and soldiers, and narrated by compiled quotes of previous U.S. Presidents.[43] Through the maintained exposure of television broadcast, recruiting methods continued to evolve from the simple days of Uncle Sam posters and movie theater introductions. However, the U.S. Military still employs a multitude of conventional advertising channels including radio, print media – newspapers and magazines, and television commercials.

          The four largest branches of the U.S. Armed Forces, Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines, have quite an extensive social media presence. Coinciding with U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, from 2001 to 2014, was the rise of the internet and social media. During the height of these conflicts was when the U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines began their social media campaigns. After examining each branch’s official page on YouTube and Twitter, the key data points for their accounts analytics were compiled on 19 April 2015. The U.S. Army joined YouTube in March 2006, amassing 2,587,245 views over 780 videos with 19,460 subscribers; and later joining Twitter in September 2007, accumulating over 627,000 followers with 21,900 tweets.[44] [45] The U.S. Air Force joined YouTube in January 2008, amassing 9,554,804 views over 1,622 videos with 35,370 subscribers; and later joining Twitter in January 2009, accumulating over 407,000 followers with 25,900 tweets.[46] [47] The U.S. Navy joined YouTube in March 2006, amassing 29,478,673 views over 5,497 videos with 40,532 subscribers; and later joining Twitter in July 2009, accumulating over 463,000 followers with 18,200 tweets.[48] [49] The U.S. Marines joined YouTube in November 2005, amassing 21,015,729 views over 1,555 videos with 76,901 subscribers; and later joining Twitter in November 2007, accumulating over 537,000 followers with 10,800 tweets.[50] [51] In total, these four branches have garnered over 62,626,451 views over 9,454 videos with 172,263 subscribers on YouTube and over 2,034,000 followers with 76,800 tweets on Twitter. The reach of U.S. Armed Forces recruiting has grown exponentially with the advent of social media.

          The increased emphasis for the use of social media in communications and advertising has acted as a major catalyst in outreach and recruiting efforts. The common motifs of country, duty, patriotism, purpose, and experience are transmitted through electronic methods. The successful recruitment advertising campaigns of the U.S. Armed Forces have employed common thematic production styles and audio-visual elements since the redoubled efforts began after 2001. Scenes of battle, military imagery, regimental consociation, and impassioned background music are central components to the efficacy of U.S. Armed Forces recruiting media. Combined with the effects of the Internet and globalization, the recruiting media used by the U.S. Armed Forces has been viewed the world over.

Same Tactics, Different Intent

          The commonalities in recruiting efforts between the U.S. Armed Forces and the Islamic State are numerous. Coincidentally, the intent of recruiting in both organizations are also similar in nature on a main point: Islamic State’s campaign to recruit fighters to volunteer to leave their homes to fight on foreign soil mirrors the U.S. Armed Forces recruiting campaign to likewise find volunteers to leave their homes to fight on foreign soil. The presence of either group in the Levant has proven to be a causal mechanism for regional instability. Whether the scenario is the U.S. Armed Forces fighting against Islamic State or vice-versa, both bring about the arrival of foreign fighters to the region. Even the driving motivation for the individual fighting for their respective cause stems from the same alluring playbook of recruiting media production. The strategies employed by Islamic State communications outreach closely resembles, and even outright plagiarizes, the approaches and recruiting themes employed by the all-volunteer U.S. Armed Forces. Video media from either group contains four major components: 1) Military imagery, 2) Coherent narrative of duty, 3) Enlivening orchestral music, and 4) Quality production editing.

          Military imagery is the easiest component to capture. All videos released, from either party, neglect to show the absence of camouflage fatigues, even in the most minor of productions. Similarly, great measures are taken to show the might of each group’s respective hardware – for the U.S. Armed Forces that means a column of M-1 Abrams tanks and fly-bys of F-22 Raptors, while Islamic State features fleet vehicles of SUV’s and trucks with anti-aircraft guns mounted on the beds. Coherent narrative of duty can be a more nuanced task. For the U.S. Armed Forces, patriotism is an often easily aroused passion in the average American. Islamic State, a relatively new creation, has simultaneously bolstered its declared form as an autonomous and sovereign governing body, while literally destroying the history and ancient artifacts of the regions under their control.[52] Enlivening orchestral music is a subtler component, but can give the video a completely different mood. Humans involuntarily respond to music in wondrous ways. The ability to harness that pathway into the mind draws the observer closer in to the transmission. Lastly, major attention to the editing and overall quality is what differentiates between amateur footage and the appearance of a major media production. Quality of the finished product is integral to how viewers perceive the video’s message. The U.S. Armed Forces are able to go to some of the advertising industry’s best firms and invest in their own sophisticated media creation departments. Islamic State is a group constantly on the move, unable to operate in the realm of normal commerce. Nevertheless, both groups are able to record, edit, and produce major video works with proven track records in the effective recruiting. The ability of Islamic State to properly implement strict finishing standards is a vital catalyst for broadcasting their novel approach to state building.

          Social media efforts are of paramount importance to both groups, again, for related purposes. For disseminating information among current members as well as helping to raise morale within their ranks. The high quality video productions from both organizations are meaningless unless they reach their target audiences. Social media has been shown to cause gaffes in the public image of Islamic State, but also in the case of the U.S. Armed Forces. However, one of the features of social media called geotagging has presented a challenge for Islamic State, as users have accidentally revealed fighter locations and announced battle plans prematurely. As a result, the U.S. Armed Forces and their coalition allies have translated that data to use in kinetic sortie strikes on Islamic State targets in Syria and Iraq.[53] Despite the lack in low-level operational security, according to UN estimates, “the number of foreign fighters worldwide had soared by 71% between the middle of 2014 and March 2015” – the same period of time in which Islamic State aggressively used social media to release their video productions.[54]

          Islamic State influence in the Levant and the rest of the world will continue to grow until their recruiting efforts are brought to a halt. Reducing the ease of which a person can take-up arms for Islamic State alone will not cease the influx of foreign fighters. Domestic situations in a potential foreign fighter’s home country must also be improved reducing the chance that they would even want to leave home in the first place. Just as there is a large emphasis on counterterrorism in America and the Global North, so too should there be a more active counter-propaganda agency to combat the spread of Islamic State ideology via soft power methods. Granted, while soft power failed to destroy or degrade Islamic State in any measurable way during their rise to power, the key to reducing their charm and attraction to disenfranchised foreign nationals is by specifically combatting Islamic State recruiting messaging.[55] Social media has now become the latest weapon in the arsenal of asymmetrical warfare. Regardless of how Islamic State will eventually be brought down and held accountable for their atrocities, their unique recruiting campaign that was able to mobilize a wide array of willing fighters for a newly created cause will become a standard model for future extremist organizations.

U.S. War Games Reveal Faults with Current Nuclear Recovery Strategy in North Korea

A recent war games scenario conducted by the U.S. Army War College has brought to light concerning shortcomings with the U.S.'s ability to recover nuclear weapons in a failed state. CNN's Jake Tapper recently reported on this startling development. The objective of the recent war game simulation was to neutralize or secure the nuclear arsenal of a country dubbed 'North Brownland' - a nick-name for North Korea. The characteristics North Brownland shared with North Korea are quite similar; a familial dictatorial authoritarian regime, proven WMD capability, bellicose and aggressive rhetoric, and the high potential to further deteriorate into an unstable failed state. However, it should be noted that other states share the traits and would also qualify as the intended target of this war game scenario, like the cases of Syria or Pakistan. [Click Here for the current list of Foreign Policy's Failed States]

The failures experienced by the U.S. in the war games scenario were not due to a lack of strategy, technological capability, or troop levels, but rather the inability to implement the current strategy for WMD recovery and wage a conventional war. To achieve mission success, the scenario yielded a conservative estimate of 90,000 troops over a period of 56 days. Paul McLeary, of Defense News, attended the analytic review of the war game. He summarized the issues discussed by Pentagon officials,

"They're very concerned about being able to get troops who can deal with nuclear and chemical weapons where they need them quickly. And the fact [is] that over the past ten or twelve years, they haven't really invested in that capability so much. They've invested in counterinsurgency, ground vehicles, IED threats, but they haven't really spent a lot of time and money modernizing their nuclear and chemical troops."

This realization is something that I have covered, in part, with the rise of USSOCOM. The switch from conventional warfare to counterinsurgency (COIN) operations was precipitated by two driving factors present in the conflicts that the U.S. has been involved in during the post-9/11 era. The first was a change in the nature of the opposition forces the U.S. faced. In 2007 during a speech at the Council on Foreign relations, General Michael Hayden stated that,

"The Soviet Union's most deadly forces - ICBMs, tank armies - they were actually relatively easy to find, but they were very hard to kill. Intelligence was important, don't get me wrong, but intelligence was overshadowed by the need for raw, shear fire power. Today the situation is reversed. We're now in an age in which our primary adversary is easy to kill, he's just very hard to find."

Operation Fallen Void: Covert Action Assassination of Bashar Al-Assad

NOTICE AND DISCLAIMER

The content of this report is pure speculation. This assignment was a project for an intelligence course with the outline of proposing a covert action for an issue facing the world today. Any of the governmental agencies, military assets, or intelligence organizations mentioned are in no way affiliated with this report. The author of this report has no intention to cause harm to any of the targets mentioned, has no intention to become involved in the uprising in Syria, and has no intention of aiding or influencing any parties involved in the conflict. The findings, outlines, and recommendations in this report are pure fiction and should be treated and regarded as such.

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Syria has been in a state of turmoil for the past two years. The Syrian rebels, known as the Free Syrian Army (FSA), have led an uprising aimed at removing president Bashar al-Assad from power. The ongoing conflict has resulted in the deaths of over 70,000 Syrians. [Link Here] The internal strife in Syria has threatened the security of Turkey, which shares an expansive mutual border with Syria. As a result, diplomatic relations between the two, once allied, countries has rapidly deteriorated. This constant state of upheaval also threatens the security of Israel and Lebanon, both of which have had a long and complicated history with Syria as well. The consensus of the western world is that Bashar al-Assad has lost all legitimacy as a ruler, expecting his demise and ouster to be forthcoming. However, two major veto-power players in the UN, Russia and China, have been virulently opposed to any call for Assad to step down – or let alone condemnation. The Syrian regime is a valuable business, economic, and defense partner with Russian and Chinese interests. So even amidst that atrocities being perpetrated at the direction of Assad, he has essentially been given a free pass.

The U.S. has actively pursued every diplomatic channel for bringing about conflict cessation in Syria, but to no avail. The U.S. has approached the UN, the Arab League, and NATO entities, but no collective action has been firmly implemented. The public nature of the conflict, as well as the brazen nature of Assad’s response has removed any doubt as to the dire situation facing the future of Syria. Human rights organizations and foreign journalists have documented the constant deterioration of civility expanding throughout Syria. While not officially intervening with boots on the ground in Syria, the U.S. and other regional allies have facilitated support for the FSA. The stagnation of progress to bringing about a peaceful cessation of conflict in Syria is only expanding. Thus the urgency and severity of this conflict demand that there be a military action aimed at ending the brutal crackdown of the Assad regime.

Mission Directive:

The U.S. would provide logistical and strategical support to a limited amount of the resistance elements within the FSA for the explicit purpose of facilitating the targeted assassination of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The Assad regime has so far weathered numerous losses in the form of defections and fatalities. However, Assad has been able to retain crucial elements of the Syrian Security Forces. This is due to a unique position that Assad has by virtue of an ethnic identity – being a member of the Alawite minority. Furthermore, the personality cult that surrounds Assad’s brand of authoritarian rule is a remnant of his Father’s, Hafez al-Assad, reign over Syria.

By eliminating Bashar al-Assad from the picture multiple goals could be achieved. Without Assad at the helm, the command structure of the Syrian regime would crumble. This would bring about the swift cessation of government directed attacks against civilian targets. Riding the wave of the Arab Spring, the lack of a head of state in Syria would usher in the much anticipated transfer and restructuring of executive power. Russian and Chinese interests in Syria are centered on the relationship they had with Assad. With him then gone, Russian and Chinese resistance to a regime change would be effectively eliminated. Also, Iran enters the geopolitical implications of Syria. The recent actions of Bashar al-Assad and the repressive rule of the Assad family in Syria has fomented ire and disdain in the Syrian population. With the oppressive figure of Assad gone, the public would be free of that directed threat. The years of pent up angst would manifest itself in opposition to former Syrian allies. This would include Hezbollah, Russia, and Iran. The power vacuum left in the wake of this upheaval would be more favorable to U.S. interests – or at the very least, western aligned interests.

Methodology and Tactics:

The Free Syrian Army (FSA) Logo

The assassination of Bashar al-Assad could easily be achieved by targeted sorties of the Syrian Presidential Palace in Damascus. However, this would be blatantly obvious and remove the plausible deniability of the U.S. So instead the U.S. would utilize opposition elements of the Free Syrian Army to execute the mission. The CIA will provide lethal aid to resistance groups. This can be achieved by outsourcing delivery of goods to Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. This initial step is the base of the overall approach. The better armed the FSA is, the more effective they will be when combatting government security forces. Also, this blanket approach with escalate the conflict, forcing the Assad regime to focus more on internal affairs.

The main component of the covert action consists of two sub-parts. First is the deployment of U.S. Special Forces to southern Turkey to train the FSA elements selected for carrying out the targeted assassination mission(s) aimed at Bashar al-Assad. The second is the enlistment of intelligence and intelligence collection assets. These are needed to fully grasp the security challenges posed by targeting Assad. A wide array of SIGINT assets will be utilized in the Syrian theater. And to a lesser extent, the utilization of HUMINT assets that can be gleaned from Jordanian, Saudi, or Turkish intelligence counterparts. This will provide details as to the location and vulnerabilities of Assad.

For the training of the FSA to carry out a directed assassination, two specialized pieces of the U.S. Army will be needed. The CIA will locate and stage a training area in southern Turkey – with the assistance of the Turkish government. Delta Force will be primarily responsible for the training of the FSA elements with the 101st Airborne Division providing security and general assistance at the camp. The training will have to take place at an accelerated rate, but given the fact that the FSA is comprised of a large number of Syrian Security Forces defectors, the training can be adapted and tailored to incorporate what formal military training they have. The use of these two U.S. Army elements will make the integration of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) easier. In addition, the National Security Agency (NSA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) will all be utilized to provide solid, actionable intelligence to the FSA.

Drones in America's Skies: The Policy for Targeting Americans

Amidst the hold up of President Barack Obama's nominee for Director of the CIA, John Brennan, in Congress, opposition Republicans are inquiring about the possibility of armed drones flying in American skies. This might seem like an Orwellian inquiry directed towards the Ministry of Peace, but the notion is not that distant from reality. An American, Anwar Al-Aulaqi, has already been killed by an armed CIA drone in Yemen. Also, UAV's have been authorized to fly over U.S. airspace. Currently, there have been zero missions involving armed CIA drones in the U.S. Regardless, here are the points needing to be addressed.

The Sanctioned Killing of an American Citizen:

Anwar Al-Aulaqi in Yemen (2008)

Anwar Al-Aulaqi was born in Las Cruces, New Mexico in 1971. He was an American citizen from birthright, but did adopt Yemeni citizenship, becoming a dual citizen. He sought to bring destruction and terror to American soil via his involvement with Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP). He eventually became Al-Qaeda's recruiter, having proven contact with Fort Hood shooter Major Nidal Hasan and the underwear bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab [Link Here]. The Obama administration has authorized the killings of numerous foreign terrorists, but this case specifically deals with an American citizen. The uproar surrounding this has not been in defense of Anwar Al-Aulaqi, but rather concern that a U.S. President, with just a quick signature, can authorize the summary execution of an American once they leave U.S. borders. This notion is entirely false.

Upon learning about the addition of Anwar Al-Aulaqi to CIA and JSOC kill lists without "charge, trial, or conviction," his father, Nasser Al-Aulaqi sued Barack Obama, in his official capacity as President of the United States; Robert Gates, in his official capacity as Secretary of Defense; and Leon Panetta, in his official capacity as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. In effect, Nasser Al-Aulaqi's filing of this suit expedited the process by which an American may be targeted. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ultimately dismissed the charges, but the ruling to dismiss included a lengthy justification. On 30 September 2011, Anwar Al-Aulaqi was killed in Yemen by Hellfire missile fired by an Armed Reaper Drone. Interestingly, in Islam, 'Hellfire' is known as 'Jahannam' - a visceral image of hell - which Anwar Al-Aulaqi alluded to when making theological appeals for supporting Al-Qaeda. [Here is the full text for the court case]

The Drones in U.S. Airspace:

U.S. Customs and Border Protection Drone

This topic has two separate aspects. The FAA allows private citizens are allowed to fly small unmanned drones in certain conditions. This policy has precipitated such recent events as a pilot of an Alitalia flight reporting the sighting of a drone in dangerous proximity to New York's JFK airport [Link Here]. The small 4 rotor craft was not a government drone. On a technical note, while UAV does stand for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, the U.S. Government refers to its aircraft as Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) or Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA).

As for military grade drones like the MQ-1B Predator, MQ-9 Reaper, and the RQ-4 Global Hawk, the policy is quite different. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, an agency under the Department of Homeland Security, regularly uses 9 unarmed Predator drones for reconnaissance purposes along America's borders [Link Here]. The ethical questions enters the frame due to the lack of an active, hands on pilot, opting instead for a remote controller. Essentially, this is no different from conventional patrol aircraft, like helicopters - save for the fact that agents in conventional aircraft are generally armed.

Recent Developments:

Senator Rand Paul contacted both John Brennan, currently the 'Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism' as well as aforementioned nominee for director of the CIA, and Attorney General Eric Holder to inquire about "the President ha[ving] the power to authorize lethal force, such as drone strikes, against a U.S. citizen on U.S. citizen on U.S. soil, and without trial." Senator Paul published both of the responses he received. An analysis of the documents have yielded important insight into the domestic drone program. John Brennan referred Senator Paul's question regarding the President's power to the Department of Justice.

The CIA's Fatal Error: Doubling Down on a Double Agent

The blatant infractions on basic protocols by the CIA culminated in unsuspected attack with devastating effect. The central downfall in this instance was exactly the nature of human intelligence – it was simply human error. A combination of anxiety, anticipation, and an eagerness to follow through with the assigned mission directives made the usually methodical and careful CIA agents overlook the basic procedures that had allowed them to feel so invincible.

The mistake on the part of the CIA was that in their excitement in learning about and then pursuing al-Balawi was that they put all of their eggs in one basket – or rather put too many officers in one building with their informant. The plan penned by the Pakistani Taliban and al-Balawi is not in itself all that sophisticated on their end. It relied more upon the naïve enthusiasm of an American intelligence community wearied by war. The CIA lulled themselves into a false sense of security due in part because of the rigorous and comprehensive security minded pre-requisites and checks they had. It was the long-term success of these compiled policies that facilitated this almost complacent mindset that would precipitate the environment in which this attack would occur.

This scenario involved a breakdown at numerous levels. However, the extent of the breakdown becomes greater the closer the contact with the Jordanian al-Balawi became. It seems almost like a given fact that the President of the United States or the Director of the CIA would react to this sort of potential scenario in a given manner. With as many irons in the fire as the American intelligence community, let alone the CIA has, that orders would be given with an imperative tone in regards to the potential success of the unfolding mission. This type of action has been taken in the past and will continue to be taken in the future.

Humam al-Balawi in a video

What has to be examined is, what I feel to be, the two other factors/variables: the Jordanian intelligence contact and the actual CIA handlers in Khost. It is no secret that the Jordanian intelligence service is easily one of the preeminent forces in the Middle East; and because of that America is lucky to count it in its allies. America is really just unable to jump into Jordanian intelligence affairs and tell them to implement reforms suited to what we see as our mission. Since this is a realized implausibility, the proper course of action is now just to alter how our interactions with the Jordanians are conducted. This is seemingly the only way we can account for a needed change.

Ultimately, the central fault on behalf of the CIA was because of the agents on the ground. As far as actual recourse or discipline for the involved members, that is not a possibility because sadly and unfortunately the people at fault were also the ones who met their ultimate demise in the attack. But this is also groundwork for a learning exercise of why the basic security checks are such a central part to maintaining the integrity and safety of the CIA agents and the bases. Granted there was quite an extensively fabricated background suggesting who al-Balawi was supposed to be and also what he was supposed to potentially yield – all of that could have been undone by simply following basic protocol.   

Yes, there are the occasional breakdown leading to a massive failure along the like of al-Balawi and Khost. While this was the single deadliest attack on the CIA in nearly 2 decades, over the history of the Agency, coldly put, it still averages out to a fairly high success rate. Whether the deep progress into Chapman Base in Khost, Afghanistan made by al-Balawi was a result of intimate knowledge with CIA handling protocols or rather just an attack of the greatest opportunity; the engrained necessity in the CIA to keep meetings and interactions with contacts as clandestine as possible unwittingly circumvented the infrastructure of security protocols designed to prevent this type of attack and infiltration from happening.

Here is a brief 5 minute clip from the film Zero Dark Thirty. This scene is a depiction of the events that transpired at the CIA station in Khost on that fateful December day in 2009. The depiction of the suicide attack in the film is a great emulation of how Joby Warrick describes it in his book. I feel this adds educational and commentary value to my critique. In the scene's dialogue, you can clearly hear the pleas by the female station chief to bypass regular security protocols.

FAIR USE NOTICE: I am using this brief video clip in the capacity of a student, academic, and as an educator. I do not claim any ownership rights to the video footage and in no way will I make a financial profit in the course of using this clip. http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fl102.html