Welcome to Global Peace Centre Canada (GPCC)

Ziauddin Yousafzai & I at GPCC's Official Launch on 09 June 2015

I have some exciting news on my recent endeavours. About a year ago I started the next stage of my academic career. Since beginning my Masters program I have been fortunate enough to embark on some amazing opportunities. My current pride and joy is my position with Global Peace Centre Canada (GPCC) as a 'Communications and Electronic Outreach Intern' - a continuation from my work developing their prototype structure as part of an MPACS course assignment.

The mission of Global Peace Centre Canada (GPCC) is "to foster societal transformation and fulfill human potential through education and peacebuilding." I am pleased to have such a positive and motivated group of colleagues in the GPCC. The Honorary Chair of GPCC is Ziauddin Yousafzai, father of 2014 Nobel Peace Prize winner Malala Yousafzai. My role with GPCC is to help spread his message of peace through education.

Through skills acquired from firsthand experience with this very blog, dabbling in video editing with my YouTube channel, and familiarity with graphic design, I was able to produce an outreach video for Global Peace Centre Canada.



In producing this video, I edited the various clips, composed and recorded the theme song, designed and rendered the intro and outro segments, and developed the storyline to help capture the spirit of Ziauddin Yousafzai along with the mission and vision of Global Peace Centre Canada.

I hope to share more developments with my summer internship and GPCC in the coming future!

Thanks,
-NK
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The CIA's Fatal Error: Doubling Down on a Double Agent

The blatant infractions on basic protocols by the CIA culminated in unsuspected attack with devastating effect. The central downfall in this instance was exactly the nature of human intelligence – it was simply human error. A combination of anxiety, anticipation, and an eagerness to follow through with the assigned mission directives made the usually methodical and careful CIA agents overlook the basic procedures that had allowed them to feel so invincible.

The mistake on the part of the CIA was that in their excitement in learning about and then pursuing al-Balawi was that they put all of their eggs in one basket – or rather put too many officers in one building with their informant. The plan penned by the Pakistani Taliban and al-Balawi is not in itself all that sophisticated on their end. It relied more upon the naïve enthusiasm of an American intelligence community wearied by war. The CIA lulled themselves into a false sense of security due in part because of the rigorous and comprehensive security minded pre-requisites and checks they had. It was the long-term success of these compiled policies that facilitated this almost complacent mindset that would precipitate the environment in which this attack would occur.

This scenario involved a breakdown at numerous levels. However, the extent of the breakdown becomes greater the closer the contact with the Jordanian al-Balawi became. It seems almost like a given fact that the President of the United States or the Director of the CIA would react to this sort of potential scenario in a given manner. With as many irons in the fire as the American intelligence community, let alone the CIA has, that orders would be given with an imperative tone in regards to the potential success of the unfolding mission. This type of action has been taken in the past and will continue to be taken in the future.

Humam al-Balawi in a video

What has to be examined is, what I feel to be, the two other factors/variables: the Jordanian intelligence contact and the actual CIA handlers in Khost. It is no secret that the Jordanian intelligence service is easily one of the preeminent forces in the Middle East; and because of that America is lucky to count it in its allies. America is really just unable to jump into Jordanian intelligence affairs and tell them to implement reforms suited to what we see as our mission. Since this is a realized implausibility, the proper course of action is now just to alter how our interactions with the Jordanians are conducted. This is seemingly the only way we can account for a needed change.

Ultimately, the central fault on behalf of the CIA was because of the agents on the ground. As far as actual recourse or discipline for the involved members, that is not a possibility because sadly and unfortunately the people at fault were also the ones who met their ultimate demise in the attack. But this is also groundwork for a learning exercise of why the basic security checks are such a central part to maintaining the integrity and safety of the CIA agents and the bases. Granted there was quite an extensively fabricated background suggesting who al-Balawi was supposed to be and also what he was supposed to potentially yield – all of that could have been undone by simply following basic protocol.   

Yes, there are the occasional breakdown leading to a massive failure along the like of al-Balawi and Khost. While this was the single deadliest attack on the CIA in nearly 2 decades, over the history of the Agency, coldly put, it still averages out to a fairly high success rate. Whether the deep progress into Chapman Base in Khost, Afghanistan made by al-Balawi was a result of intimate knowledge with CIA handling protocols or rather just an attack of the greatest opportunity; the engrained necessity in the CIA to keep meetings and interactions with contacts as clandestine as possible unwittingly circumvented the infrastructure of security protocols designed to prevent this type of attack and infiltration from happening.

Here is a brief 5 minute clip from the film Zero Dark Thirty. This scene is a depiction of the events that transpired at the CIA station in Khost on that fateful December day in 2009. The depiction of the suicide attack in the film is a great emulation of how Joby Warrick describes it in his book. I feel this adds educational and commentary value to my critique. In the scene's dialogue, you can clearly hear the pleas by the female station chief to bypass regular security protocols.

FAIR USE NOTICE: I am using this brief video clip in the capacity of a student, academic, and as an educator. I do not claim any ownership rights to the video footage and in no way will I make a financial profit in the course of using this clip. http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fl102.html

Canada's Continuing Commitment to NATO and ISAF

I wrote this analysis for a course I took called '9/11 and the War on Terror.' This policy memo served as our term paper, in lieu of a traditional final exam. Our assignment was to examine an aspect of the war in Afghanistan. I chose this topic because of my Canadian roots and my interest in NATO. Learn how early friendly fire incidents and experiencing the highest proportional rate of fatalities amongst active ISAF partners provided Canada’s policy makers with adequate justification for actually expressing the public’s will in regards to reducing military engagement. However, an analysis of public opinion, voting trends, and implemented policy clearly demonstrate Canada’s commitment to NATO and ISAF, even amidst the Afghan disengagement.

Executive Summary

The first Canadian casualties in the Afghanistan war were inflicted as a result of friendly fire. A U.S. F-16 fighter pilot bombed a staging area for a Canadian training exercise in a location known as the Tarnak Farms.[1] This incident happened just over six months into the Afghan war. By examining the background of this friendly fire incident, insight to the continued Canadian commitment can be gleaned. Furthermore, Canada has experienced the highest proportional rate of fatalities amongst active ISAF partners in Afghanistan.[2] Canadian policymakers proceeded to utilize this information when they reduced troop levels at a time when the U.S. was planning a troop surge.[3] This reality altered and shifted Canada’s role with ISAF in Afghanistan. Canada then began disengagement in Afghanistan and reverting to a support role in the ISAF mission.

Public opinion polls taken in Canada after the 9/11 attacks concerning U.S. – Canadian relations and of the war in Afghanistan under the Stephen Harper government will illustrate the opinion landscape. From there, government policies will be examined for mention or justification vis-à-vis public opinion. Historically, Canada and the U.S. have shared the world’s largest economic relationship. They also share the world’s largest border. Canada’s empathy for the 9/11 terrorist attack against the U.S. will also be represented in public opinion polls. So it seems as if Canada must continue to support their southern neighbors in endeavors of war as a way to bolster other more beneficial channels. The relationship Canada has with the U.S. appears to be one based upon ideological obligation, rather than one of true support. So it appears that friendly fire incidents, while not the U.S.’s intentions, and a higher rate of soldier deaths provide Canada’s policy makers with adequate justification for actually expressing the public’s will in regards to reducing military engagement. Similarly, voting patterns for the national government are indicative of the waning support for the war in Afghanistan. The elections in Canada in 2008 and 2006 will provide data as to how Canada voted in a post 9/11 political theater during the lead-up to the U.S. surge. The analysis and evaluation of public opinion, voting trends, and implemented policy clearly demonstrate Canada’s commitment to NATO and ISAF, even amidst the Afghan disengagement.

Canada’s Role in Afghanistan

            Canada is a founding signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty. As such, Canada is one of the most senior partners in the alliance, often taking on roles of leadership. After the September 11^th attack against the U.S. in 2001, by virtue of their NATO membership, Canada was thrust into the Afghan War. In response to the attack, the U.S. invoked Article 5 of the NATO treaty which effectively made the attack on the U.S. an attack against all of NATO’s members. This is the first, and only, time this common defense article has been invoked. The response was assembled, but how the joint military force would manifest had yet to be established. It was not until late 2001 that the UN passed Security Council Resolution 1386, which “authorize[d], as envisaged in Annex 1 to the Bonn Agreement, the establishment for 6 months of an International Security Assistance Force.”[4] As the UN mentioned, the outline for the ISAF force was described in the Bonn Agreement and was charged with, “assist[ing] in the maintenance of security for Kabul and its surrounding areas” with the understanding that “such a force could, as appropriate, be progressively expanded to other urban centres and other areas.”[5]

            According to the Canadian Minister of Defence, the first Canadian personnel to arrive in Afghanistan was, “approximately 40 JTF2 (Joint Task Force) Operators on the ground in Afghanistan, in or around Kandahar.”[6] As the force build up in Afghanistan continued into 2002, Canada was fully compliant with ISAF military directives and they fought alongside their American and ISAF counter-parts. NATO assumed command of ISAF on August 11^th, 2003.[7] After the change in command, Canadian forces began their contribution to NATO, Operation Athena. Based in the capital, Kabul, and later expanding to Kandahar Province, Operation Athena focused on peace building exercises and civilian population interaction.[8]

Fratricide and Troop Casualty Rates

            During a Canadian only training exercise in April of 2002, Canadian forces would be dealt their single largest troop loss since the Korean War. The absolutely tragic nature of the Canadian loss was multiplied by the fact that it was “an American F-16 fighter jet [that] dropped a laser-guided 225-kilogram bomb” on the Tarnak farms training area. The devastating result was a total of 4 deaths and 8 injuries, marking the first loss of Canadian forces in the Afghan War. There was a major outcry from the Canadian public and outrage from government officials.  Once more details about the tragic friendly fire incident were revealed, the anger grew. There was even public criticism from the Canadian military that was directed at the U.S. forces. General Ray Henault, Canadian Chief of Staff, immediately stated that, “Without a doubt, there was a misidentification of the Canadians and what they were doing on the ground and that was obviously the cause of this accident.”[9] In response, President George W. Bush offered a public apology for the tragedy and commended and thanked the Canadian forces for their continued support.

One Year Later: Retrospection & Analyzing the Recent Dialogue

The DEVGRU Weapon of Choice: A SOPMOD M4A1

Today marks the one year anniversary of Osama Bin Laden's terminus at the hands of DEVGRU. The world's most wanted man was finally brought to justice in his Abottabad compound. Delivering this justice was two 5.56 NATO rounds fired from a SOPMOD M4A1 rifle courtesy of a SEAL Team 6 operator. He conveyed this accomplishment by declaring "For God and country - Geronimo, Geronimo, Geronimo!" These powerful words, a combination of a Latin phrase and the operational codename for their primary target, were the first uttered in a post-Bin Laden world.

In the 365 days since this successful mission was executed with surgical precision, a partisan dialogue has emerged in regards to Operation Neptune Spear. Here are two critiques of how President Barack Obama has utilized this success in the context of an election year, followed by my response:

1. Obama really didn't do anything of major operational significance, he just gave authorization for an obvious decision.

This is an argument from ignorance, plain and simple. The outcome had the potential to be the worst American military fiasco since Operation Eagle Claw during the 1979 Iran hostage crisis, or more recently in comparison to 'Black Hawk Down' in 1993. The location of this high-valued target was in the borders of the sovereign nation of Pakistan and only minutes away from the Pakistan Military Academy, their equivalent to West Point. Compounding the risk was the current anti-American political climate among Pakistanis. Not withstanding the fact this would be the first time a nuclear state would have their sovereignty directly challenged in such a manner - adding the unprecedented, and albeit unlikely, potential of two nuclear powers going directly to war with each other.

A Glimpse inside the Situation Room

Furthermore, as Commander in Chief, Barack Obama is the supreme commander of the United States Armed Forces. This integral role should not be overlooked. SEAL Team 6 launching a ground operation was never set in stone. Obama was presented with three potential courses of action. The first was a joint US/Pakistani ground operation; easily the most diplomatic. Second was having the site renovated from a compound to a crater, courtesy of a B2 Spirit Stealth Bomber. Third was the option of the Seal Team 6 raid. The decision to go with the latter of the three options was not the easiest choice to come to. The joint operation had numerous potentials for error: intel leaks, logistical time delays, and a lack of prior precedent for how to conduct a US/PAK operation. The sortie would have guaranteed target annihilation, but would have had catastrophic levels of collateral damage - and no bodies to account for the mission's justification. So while the third option looked the most tantalizing, it put 79 American Soldiers on the ground. This meant boots on foreign soil, in pursuit of an unconfirmed target.

Regardless of what the President may or may not be doing in regards to referencing the success of this operation, credit must be given where credit is due. Diminishing Obama's role in Bin Laden's take down is more petty, ignorant, and deleterious than what any superimposed political narrative is accusing the President of doing.

2. Obama is employing divisive and unethical rhetoric when using Bin Laden's death as a part of his 2012 campaign platform.

There are so many elements wrong with this assertion. Most prominently is the fact that the majority of these attacks are coming from the right. While there may be legitimate critiques, Republicans are being hypocritical in their claims. The outline for what the Obama 2012 campaign is doing in terms of using national security, foreign policy, and successes in a war are no different than the Bush 2004 campaign [As Slate Magazine Demonstrates].

Should President Obama be able to laud the success of killing Bin Laden as part of his campaign? Without question. Especially because of his visit to Afghanistan and Bagram Airbase yesterday. To question Obama's visit to an active war zone, to visit American troops, and on the anniversary of Bin Laden's death, simply proved the foolishness and ignorance of those accusing him of grabbing cheap political gains.

Personally, I cannot think of a stronger message to send to the world than to return to the homeland of al-Qaeda on the one year anniversary of their founder's demise at our hands, and outlining a way to responsibly draw down a decade long conflict. 

History has shown that hasty military withdrawals that are irrespective and inconsiderate of real world implications have extremely negative consequences. And before anybody scoffs at President Obama's announcement to commit US and NATO forces to Afghanistan for the next decade, remember how all of this was started in the first place. Like it or not, al-Qaeda grew from the seeds of the American-backed Afghan Mujahadeen that fought against the Soviets forces during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The gravitas of this salute to America's determination and accomplishments easily exceeds Bush's landing on an aircraft carrier to proclaim 'Mission Accomplished.' And if the question were asked "Would Mitt Romney visit American troops at Bagram Airbase, in an active war zone, on the one year anniversary of Bin Laden's demise?" The answer would be 'No.' Mitt Romney decided to just mail it in.

Personally, I took time to reflect on the events surrounding Bin Laden's death. I found that certain sentiments that haven't changed, and I ultimately came to the same conclusion. To convey my current thoughts on the matter, I will quote from an oped I wrote for the University of Oklahoma's student news paper a year ago:

"Regardless, this is a time for celebration; if not solely for the death of a fellow human being, but for putting and end to what he [Osama Bin Laden] did and stood for. Hopefully a step in the direction of closure for those affected by the events of 9/11; and ultimately making it a little easier to breath for the Human Race as a whole."

[See my original op-ed in full at the OU Daily, Here]