The Islamic State (ISIL/ISIS): Religion, Recruiting, and Resistance

Video from VOX: "Syria's War: Who is Fighting and Why"
The recent attacks in Paris, France have thrust the Islamic State (ISIL/ISIS/IS) back into the spotlight. The topics of terrorism, the Syrian conflict, and the Islamic State are something I have both covered in great depth in recent years and have been focused on for a while. I have yet to coalesce all of my various works into a single readily accessible format, so here is my attempt. I have included relevant portions from each work, but I encourage you to read the full works in their entirety. I hope this will strengthen your understanding on the subject matter.

Lone Wolf Terrorism in a 'New Kind of War':

"The solitary nature of a lone-wolf terrorist attack is strategically problematic for law enforcement entities. When a group or cell conspires to plan a hostile terrorist act, the way to infiltrate and disrupt the plot is by finding the weakest link in the chain. Accomplishing this process becomes increasingly difficult as the network becomes smaller in size. Less people involved means less communication – if there is only a single person, possibly compromising communications are virtually eliminated. Lone wolf terrorism has emerged as the new face of violent terrorist attacks. The solitary nature of the attackers helps to isolate their plans from incursion by law enforcement or intelligence analysts. These attacks can be sudden, grievous, and often times happen without warning. Thus, finally figuring out how to preemptively combat this issue is of great importance."

[Excerpt from "U.S. Counterintelligence & Lone Wolf Terrorism: The Evolving Approach to Combat an Emerging Threat" written in 2012. Read more Here (PDF)]

Theological Justifications in Extremist Ideologies:

"The justifications used by extremist organizations will be exposed for what they are: nationalistic and not theological. The basis for their ideologies is an appeal to Islamic scripture. In order to illuminate the specific arguments or underlying themes, a survey of relevant scripture will  be included and scrutinized. [and ]As demonstrated, when examined in realist terms a la Pape’s CPOST Study, the explanation for martyrdom and resistance become separated from Islamic theology. If the West becomes educated on the multifaceted issue of suicide terrorism, they would see Islam is not some inherent threat. Yes, this – or any – religion can be co-opted,  but nothing makes Islamic theology inherently more deadly than Christianity or Judaism."

[Excerpt from "Martyrdom and the Afterlife in Islam: Analyzing Theological Justifications in Extremist Ideologies" written in 2013. Read more Here (html) or Here (PDF)]

Inside the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM):

"The U.S.’s tier one fighting force is known as United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The purpose of USSOCOM is to “Provide fully capable SpecialOperations Forces to defend the United States and its interests [and to] Synchronize planning of global operations against terrorist networks." After 9/11, U.S. Special Forces had to switch gears and operate within a radical new framework. What resulted from this shift was an overhaul of how military and intelligence agencies were structured. Interagency cooperation between civilian and military agencies was increased, while redundancies were reduced. With no allegiances to a flag or a state, the new enemy aligned with ideas and personalities. The global playing field switched from state actors to insurgencies, transnational revolutionaries, and civilian combatants."

[Excerpt from "USSOCOM: Firefights & Finances" written in 2012. Read more Here (html) or Here (PDF)]

The Responsibility to Protect and the Syrian Uprising:

"The Syrian regime has been unapologetic in every endeavor of the uprising. The man in power, Bashar al-Assad, is a strong-armed authoritarian dictator. His political ideology is rooted in the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party. Over 40 years of brutal repression in Syria helped to shape the fervent anti-Assad sentiments in the conflict zones. Just as the tyranny increased, the denizens’ willingness to tolerate it decreased. With Russia continuing to threaten to veto any Security Council resolutions condemning the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, the realization that diplomacy is often a stall tactic is not hard to grasp. Any delay in the UN deliberations that Russia could help to facilitate via veto power prolonged the conflict in Syria. Russia’s long term interests in Syria were established prior to the uprising, but an analysis of the current scenario yields a chilling understanding. Since the Syrian government was utilizing regular military troops to conduct operations on civilian targets, the resources being used to execute these missions – small arms, tanks, and artillery -  were also Russian supplied. As it currently stands, the bloody struggle in Syria is ongoing despite multilateral ceasefire talks. Even though Syria has used and implemented the prototypical style of a mass atrocity military campaign, no external force has yet to intervene militarily or humanitarianly."

[Excerpt from "The Syrian Uprising: The Responsibility to Protect & The Failure of Conflict Cessation" written in 2012. Read more Here (PDF)]

Analyzing the History, Recruiting Techniques, and Social Media of the Islamic State:

"The Levant continues to be rife with conflict and destabilizing violence. The largest draw to the region is the enticement of Islamic State via their recruiting efforts through social media and video productions. Islamic State started with the migration of regional al-Qaeda affiliated foreign fighters arriving to fight in the Syrian Civil War. Islamic State has quite a sophisticated media production division and their social media efforts are just as relentless. Each video released by the Islamic State has its own unique message and substance while still adhering to a coherent message. The commonalities in recruiting efforts between the U.S. Armed Forces and the Islamic State are numerous. Coincidentally, the intent of recruiting in both organizations are also similar in nature on a main point: Islamic State’s campaign to recruit fighters to volunteer to leave their homes to fight on foreign soil mirrors the U.S. Armed Forces recruiting campaign to likewise find volunteers to leave their homes to fight on foreign soil. Just as there is a large emphasis on counterterrorism in America and the Global North, so too should there be a more active counter- propaganda agency to combat the spread of Islamic State ideology via soft power methods."

[Excerpt from "What Are We Fighting For? How Islamic State Uses United States Armed Forces Recruiting Methods to Mobilize Foreign Fighters in a Struggle for the New Caliphate" written in 2015. Read more Here (html) or Here (PDF)]

How Soft Power Policy Failed to 'Destroy or Degrade' the Islamic State:

"Although the military advance of IS across the Levant region have been nearly unimpeded, efforts have been launched to resolve the regional conflict outside the context of a military intervention. The UN has attempted to bring about conflict cessation through conflict mediators, regional forces such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan have used a mix of military and non-lethal support, and grassroots efforts have been deployed on a local level. Nonviolent peacebuilding efforts implicitly rely on good faith measures from all  parties involved. Prior to IS seizing control, the Syrian regime was the sole coercive force in the Syrian regions. he use of soft power to combat the influence and advance of IS in Syria and Iraq has been met with increased barbarity and continued bloodshed. Relief efforts and non-lethal assistance has been delivered to the denizens of IS controlled territories in Syria and Iraq. However, the use of diplomacy, nonviolent peacebuilding, and humanitarian aid is a currency which IS refuses to trade in. While conflict cessation or the reduction of IS control cannot be achieved by soft power or nonviolent methods of peacebuilding, the key to a lasting calm beyond the reign of IS certainly lies in these approaches."

[Excerpt from "An Analysis of Promoting Peace in a Realist Conflict: Non-Violent Attempts to Destroy & Degrade the Islamic State (IS)" written in 2015. Read more Here (html) or Here (PDF)]

Connect with TheNolanK on Social Media:

What Are We Fighting For? How Islamic State uses U.S. Armed Forces Recruiting Methods to Mobilize Foreign Fighters

My latest term at Conrad Grebel University College for my Master of Peace and Conflict Studies (MPACS) graduate programme has been long and arduous. The focus of my studies have been on the multifaceted nature of Islamic State. Drawing on course themes, I have analyzed Islamic State through many different perspectives. Previously, I wrote a paper on "The Failure of Soft Power to Destroy or Degrade Islamic State". The following article is an analysis of Islamic State and their unprecedented recruiting campaign, specifically in their use of social media and their target audience of foreign fighters.

(Here is an Academia.edu link for a .PDF version)

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Note of Process and Terminology

          Media outlets, politicians, academics, and denizens of Islamic State controlled territory have referred to this organization as ‘Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham’ or ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’ – ISIS, ‘Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’ – ISIL, and/or ‘ad-Dawlah al-Islamiyah fil-Iraq wash-Sham’ – DAESH. In the context of this report, ‘Islamic State’ will be uniformly used throughout for the name of the group in question. The geographic region known as the ‘Levant’ will be understood to include the modern nations of Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, and Lebanon. Any comments on or portrayal of Islam or its theology will be representative of Islamic State ideology and is in no way representative of true or mainstream Islamic thought.[1] In addition, when Arabic or Islamic elements are described, they will be transliterated from Arabic to English using a simplified phonetic spelling. References to the United States Armed Forces in comparison to Islamic State are in no way meant to be defamatory or critical. Any comparisons are made for that singular specific juxtaposition and do not extend in scope beyond what is described therein.

Introduction

          The Levant continues to be rife with conflict and destabilizing violence. The most recent conflict to strike the region started in spring 2011 as the Syrian Uprising – and has since metastasized into the Syrian Civil War. The death toll from the ongoing conflict ranges from a United Nations (UN) estimated 220,000 to a Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) estimated 310,000.[2] [3] Amidst the chaos of a conflicted region were the waning hours of an American combat operation, Operation Iraqi Freedom, in Iraq. The United States Armed Forces decision to withdraw combat troops in Iraq by December of 2011 left an immense power vacuum in the still destabilized Levant region. Emboldened by Western and American inaction, the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad continued its brutal military crackdown on opposition movements within Syria’s borders. In response to the Assad regime’s offensives against civilian neighbourhoods, resistance forces began fighting back against regime security forces and likewise aligned paramilitary militias. The subsequent eruption of open conflict flooded the region with what has been described as “the largest foreign fighter mobilization since the Afghan conflict in the 1980’s”, by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR).[4]

          The largest draw to the region is the enticement of Islamic State via their recruiting efforts through social media and video productions. Islamic State started with the migration of regional al-Qaeda affiliated foreign fighters arriving to fight in the Syrian Civil War. According to a February 2015 assessment by the United States Intelligence Community, the number of foreign nationals fighting for Islamic State are estimated at 20,00 to 31,500, with 3,400 coming from nations in the Global North.[5] United States Secretary of State John Kerry suggests that the target demographic for Islamic State recruiting are “[those] among the disaffected and disenfranchised, but also among those of all backgrounds on a misguided quest for meaning and empowerment”.[6] Islamic State is able to successfully connect with their target audience via “the power of modern communications”, as described by CIA Director John Brennan:

“New technologies can help groups like [Islamic State] coordinate operations, attract new recruits, disseminate propaganda, and inspire sympathizers across the globe to act in their name.”[7]

Islamic State has a candidate pool and the means to contact them, but potential and ability alone do not automatically convert into actually recruiting foreigners. The underlying issues described by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry are not new phenomenon in the Global North, especially regarding those who are first or second generation immigrants from outsider countries.

The most prominent societal issues are often predicated on institutionalized racism and discrimination. The resurgence of extreme right-wing political movements in Europe has lately exacerbated those factors. The recent economic slumps that hit the Global North have further marginalized already isolated non-Caucasian demographics. Lastly, the desire for adventure, belonging, and empowerment is a strong urge that transcends ethnic or religious divisions. Alienation from western society experienced in their own countries of residence is a key force for potential radicalization. Much like how America constantly reaffirms its national identity through hypernationalism and uniting against an enemy of the other, so too has Islamic State fashioned its ideological foundation. Understanding their target audience for supporters, Islamic State crafted their recruiting message to reflect the unique nature of their group, leading to an unprecedented mobilization campaign of foreign fighters devoted to fight and die for their newly created state.

The Rise of Islamic State Ranks[8]

          Islamic State began with an estimated 5,291 foreign fighters, of which 1,626 were from nations in the Global North, as of late 2013.[9] Since Islamic State’s rise to prominence, their number of foreign fighters, as of February 2015, increased to an NCTC estimated 20,000 fighters with roughly 3,400 of those fighters coming from nations in the Global North.[10] Although Islamic State began as a semi-autonomous al-Qaeda affiliate group, in February 2014 “al-Qaeda’s central leadership announced that it had severed ties with” Islamic State due to their excessively brutal and unforgiving tactics to Muslims and non-Muslims alike.[11] In June of 2014, in the midst of their aggressive military campaign, the American supported Iraqi military largely crumbled under the advance of Islamic State fighters, resulting in the capture of Mosul, an Iraqi city with the population of over 1 million residents.[12] Islamic State quickly took control of major cities in Eastern Syria and Northern Iraq, while in the process accruing fiscal assets, estimated to be around the “$2 billion (USD)” mark.[13]

          The current leader of Islamic State is Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, whose duties include military command, spiritual leadership, and acting as the group’s public face. Al-Baghdadi is an Iraqi-born Salafist Sunni Muslim with a claimed PhD. in Islamic Studies and alleged ties of descendancy to the Prophet Mohamed’s Quraysh tribe.[14] Al-Baghdadi was detained by U.S. Armed Forces as a civilian during Operation Iraqi Freedom, was jailed by the Iraqi government from 2005 to 2010, and placed on a UN Security Council (UNSC) “Al-Qaida and associated individuals” sanctions list on 15 August 2014.[15] Al-Baghdadi is an enigmatic figure that is rarely seen in the public eye. During one of al-Baghdadi’s rare public appearances he gave a speech to mark the creation of Islamic State, humbly saying to Islamic State fighters and denizens of the Iraqi city of Mosul that "I am not better than you or more virtuous than you".[16]

          Al-Baghdadi’s public appearance followed an online document release that outlined the aims of Islamic State:

“[the] legality of all emirates, groups, states, and organizations, becomes null by the expansion of [Islamic State’s] authority and arrival of its troops to their areas…We [Islamic State fighters] spilled rivers of our blood to water the seeds of [Islamic State], laid its foundation with our skulls, and built its tower over our corpses… It is the state for the Muslims – the oppressed of them, the orphans, the widows, and the impoverished.”[17]

The document was a well formatted ten-page .PDF transcript released in Arabic, as well as translated into four languages - English, Russian, French, and German. The manifesto laid out a bold design for what Islamic State aimed to achieve and represent. While the aggressive verbosity of the document was defended with lines from the Koran and Hadith, the tone of the message echoed the Machiavellian maxim that, for the leader of a kingdom, “it is much safer to be feared than loved, if one has to lack one of the two.”[18] Unlike Hezbollah’s foundation in 1985 and Osama Bin Laden’s Fatwas in 1996 and 1998, in which both appeal to the Ummah, Arabic for “Islamic Community”, and still operate within the dialectic of international relations, Islamic State appeals to the Ummah, while conversely rejecting the current existence of state borders, national identities, and religious denominations.

Islamic State Social Media

          Islamic State social media efforts are bold and continuous in their outreach efforts. The ability to interact instantaneously on an international scale has been heavily employed by Islamic State. Different social media platforms serve different purposes in their design: Facebook is meant for more personal interactions with a fairly limited social circle and is heavily regulated in regards to what sort of content can be posted, YouTube is the world’s most popular streaming video website and features moderate content restriction, and Twitter is meant for instantaneous and immediate communication with minimal content restrictions. Additionally, while all three of those social media websites have reporting processes for questionable or objectionable content, Twitter is the least reactive in prosecuting content removal. Hence, the most popular social media platform, for Islamic State supporters and fighters alike, is Twitter.

          Islamic State has quite a sophisticated media production division and their social media efforts are just as relentless. The media produced by Islamic State is of no usable value unless it can be broadcast to the world. Islamic State supporters have learned how to exploit the mechanics behind Twitter to positive effect. Using the ‘trends’ mechanism in Twitter’s coding, Islamic State supporter use what are known as hashtags to promote a singular identifier even in the absence of an official Islamic State Twitter account. Additionally, Islamic State supporters will often coopt regional or worldwide trends and tag Islamic State messaging with arbitrary tags in order to increase that tweet’s exposure – such as #AaronHernandezTrial, #LillyforTarget, and #StanleyCupPlayoffs. Those topics have nothing to do with Islamic State, but people who click on those tags are taken to a central page that aggregates all tweets with that tagged phrase. In a similar fashion, the tag of #baqiyah, baqiyah is Arabic for “it will remain”, is used by Islamic State supporters.[19] Going to the Twitter webpage that aggregates content with the #baqiyah tag reveals the variety of Islamic State supporters as well as the range of to what extent users declare their support. The accounts that are the most fervent and verbose in their support for Islamic State are suspended without the ability to appeal. The more subtle Islamic State supporters will often post tweets with double entendres, innuendos, vague messaging, and religious proclamations.

          Reliable data on the subject of Islamic State is hard to come by. In the realm where a person can pretend to be anybody or even an automated bot can emulate a person, the Internet can be a deceptive arena for data collection. The best estimates of pro-Islamic State Twitter users comes from a March 2015 Brookings Institute research report. The study estimated with, with over 90% confidence, that the “total number of overt [Islamic State] supporter account on Twitter [is] 46,000”.[20] They speculated that upwards of 90,000 accounts could be Islamic State supporters, while each account surveyed averaged 2,219 tweets over 1,004 followers.[21] The majority of Islamic State supporter accounts on Twitter “were created in response to the suspensions, either to replace accounts that had been taken down, or as backup accounts to hedge against future suspensions”.[22] The majority of Islamic State supporter account were created in 2014 (59.51%), while just 1.3% were created prior to 2011.[23] The report also noted that the top five countries for the Islamic State were Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq, U.S.A., and Egypt.[24] The preferred smartphone platform for Islamic State supporters is Android based (69%), with Apple (30%) and Blackberry (1%) following.[25]

          The democratized platform of social media has also presented a few challenges to Islamic State’s public image of battle hardened and disciplined warriors. With the ability to post instantaneously and independently, Islamic State fighters on the actual battlefields in Iraq and Syria can post whatever content or imagery they please. Often times Islamic State fighters post selfies on the frontlines or graphic images after a victory in battle. However, there are instances where Islamic State fighters have posted cell-phone video showing amateur mistakes with weapons handling, explosives manufacturing, or other assorted moments of failure. In response to one of Islamic State’s graphic videos, Internet users compiled all of the video clips of Islamic State fighters making mistakes and failing spectacularly into one video. The edited video shows events like “one fighter blow[ing] himself up when his rocket launcher backfires, another accidentally shoot[ing] a comrade with a machine gun… and [another] mistakenly detonates a bomb during a group photograph”.[26] In some instances social media users have even openly mocked Islamic State movements by humorously parodying their violent threats. In February 2015, Islamic State created the hashtag “#We_Are_Coming_O_Rome” to declare their aim for the center of the Western Christian world. Italian Twitter users responded by warning Islamic State fighters of the perils of rush hour traffic, unreliable public transport, and dysfunctional Italian government.[27]

          Islamic State has publicly acknowledge the importance of a proper social media policy, as stated by Abu Bakr al Janabi, an Islamic State official, in a VICE News interview:

“Social media is good for building a network of connections and recruitment… Fighters talk about experiences in battle and encourage people to rise, and supporters defend and translate ISIS statements.”[28]

Even corporations recognize that the key to increasing public exposure and earned profits is through social media, as spending on social media as a part of marketing is expected to grow upwards of 128% in the next five years.[29] Through a comprehensive and mostly coordinates social media policy, Islamic State “is able to project strength and promote engagement online”.[30] Islamic State has made a name for itself in regards to their ruthless military tactics and continuing violence, but their use of social media as an outreach and recruiting tool has been similarly successful to their overall growth.

Islamic State Media Production

          Islamic State media production is a multi-faceted propaganda and recruiting factory. The main arm of Islamic State media production is Al Hayat Media Center.[31] Al-Hayat is Arabic for ‘The Life’ and Islamic State coopted the name from a well known newspaper in the Arab world. As mentioned before, Islamic State affiliated social media accounts are frequently suspended or deleted, resulting in a lack of a single stable official social media account. The social media accounts operated by Al Hayat were promptly suspended by Twitter in the weeks after the Islamic State began to regularly publish videos. Outside of the realm of social media platforms is where Al Hayat Media Center is able to maintain a stable publication base via ‘isdarat.org’. Isdarat is Arabic for ‘Publish’ or ‘Spread’ and currently serves as the single fixed point for Islamic State’s internet presence. Islamic State also demonstrates technical knowledge in how they operate their website’s domain rights. The domain address for isdarat.org is registered to a protected and obscured registrar who holds the domain rights until January 2016.[32] The features of the website include a media archive for Islamic State videos and articles, a ‘frequently asked questions’ (FAQ) page, a feedback comments page, and separate page filters for the different geographic territories in which Islamic State is present. While the HTML design of isdarat.org is fairly basic, the overall web product is polished and comprehensive. In addition to isdarat.org, Islamic State uses Dabiq, an online English language magazine. Dabiq is a reference to the name of a Syrian city mentioned in the Hadith in reference to the end-times or the ‘Last Hour’.[33] Keeping the same style of Islamic symbolism, Islamic State purposefully chose Dabiq to fit the themes and motifs of their justification for an Islamic Caliphate.

          Islamic State uses isdarat.org as its main broadcast hub to publish Al Hayat Media Center’s video productions. Through navigating the website a visitor can easily find links to the third-party hosting mirrors for Islamic State videos. The pursuit of video files often leads to the discovery of broken URL links and the removal of hosted files. Access to these files are notoriously dubious, often coming from disreputable sources or questionable content hosts. Attempts by Islamic State to have their video content hosted on YouTube is met with minimal success, often staying active for only a few hours before the video is taken down and the associated account is terminated. Nevertheless, Islamic State has still been able to devise a method for hosting accessible media content by encrypting their uploaded files via password, obscuring the filenames, and utilizing third-party file hosts that even offer quick connection speeds with up to 8.3Mbps download rates.[34] Islamic State publishes video content on a fairly regular basis, with eight major video productions that standout above the rest.

          The first two Islamic State video releases were in relatively quick succession to each other: their first, “There is No Life without Jihad”, was released on 19 June 2014 and is 13 minutes and 16 seconds long, while their second, “The End of Sykes-Picot” was released on 29 June 2014 and is 15 minutes and 4 seconds long.[35] These two videos serve as an important foundation for the way Islamic State is represented in the digital world. While these first two videos had yet to feature the high value production and sleek editing synonymous with the latest Islamic State video releases, they still outlined two major components of Islamic State ideology. The “There is No Life without Jihad” video features exclusively English-speaking foreign fighters from countries such as Australia, U.K., Cambodia, and Bangladesh. In a clearly unscripted fashion, the men extoll the virtue of sacrificing one’s family and material possessions in the Western World to wage Jihad in order to implement the law of Allah. The “The End of Sykes-Picot” video features a Chilean Islamic State fighter giving a historical geography lesson and declaring the Sykes-Picot mandated borders in Asia Minor to be dissolved. The point is reiterated as the narrator mocks the dispossessed Iraqi Army before parading prisoners of war in front of the camera and avowing that Islamic State will strive to break more borders. While these videos are basic in their editing technique and production value, there still exists a clear narrative behind the purpose of these two videos.

          On 19 September 2014, Islamic State released the video “Flames of War”, their longest video at 55 minutes and 11 seconds. The message of “Flames of War” frames the mission aims of Islamic State by providing theological justifications for their ideology. The video flashes between passages from the Koran and Hadith overlaid on scenes of Islamic State fighting battles in Iraq and Syria. The video’s narrator states that the purpose of fighting on behalf of Islamic State is for “Allah, not land, but the [Islamic] Caliphate.”[36] The end of the video shows purported Assad regime soldiers digging their own graves while, under duress, one man makes the claim that “it’s as if Allah has blessed the Islamic State” because “ten or twenty or thirty [Islamic State fighters] captured the base when it had 800 soldiers.”[37] The videos narrator then declares the fighting has only just begun.

          Islamic State also released a series of videos showing the executions of Western journalists, aid workers, and a Jordanian fighter pilot. While Islamic State videos often feature mass executions by firing squad or beheadings, these videos strike a different tone as they are singular executions of high profile persons. The Jordanian fighter pilot execution video marked a distinct change in Islamic State video productions. The 22 minute and 34 second video released on 3 February 2015 opens with an intricate use of detailed computer-generated graphics and geographical schematics highlighted with news clips of U.S. President Barack Obama and the King of Jordan Abdullah II. The intricate digital renderings depict the Jordanian pilot’s strike sortie over Islamic State targets, while the Pilot is made to confess his guilt and wrongdoing. The video is primarily in Arabic and is directed at the immediate regional opponents of Islamic State. The video garnered widespread media attention for featuring the execution of the Jordanian pilot by being set on fire with gasoline while trapped in a metal cage. In previous videos, the Islamic State fighters wore military attire, but they were mismatched and assorted patterns – forest and desert camouflage fatigues are not meant for desert combat. This time the Islamic State fighters are shown in uniformed military attire – desert sand camouflage – while in a straight formation, postured in the same rigid manner, and even equipped with the same model of firearm. The depiction of Islamic State fighters in this video is a stark contrast to the fighters in previous videos, as the fighters now look like a professional military force. Islamic State continued with the depiction of military imagery in their next video release, showing their version of Boot Camp with various training exercises and a column of fleet vehicles dawning the Islamic State Black Standard. While the video is the shortest release at 2 minutes and 9 seconds, the imagery of the fighter training video builds upon the themes of the Jordanian fighter pilot video. However, the video features fairly low production value and was mocked by military veterans who analyzed the video.

          Islamic State shifted direction in their, as of yet, penultimate and antepenultimate video releases. Executions have been a significant component of Islamic State videos, but in these two videos the executions are the central focus. The third to last video purports to show the execution of an ‘Israeli spy’ and is 3 minutes and 17 seconds long. The execution is carried out by a young boy, probably not even sixteen years-old, shooting the prisoner in the face with a Glock pistol. The execution is captured with multiple, simultaneous camera angles and in slow motion as well. Post production effects add dramatic thematic elements to the video and colour correction effects are used to emphasize the blood and gore on the dying prisoner. The second to last video titled “Strike Their Necks” is also centered around an execution featuring youth fighters and is 4 minutes and 15 seconds long. The similar editing elements from the previous video are present here, but the method of execution was instead beheading. The executioners are dressed in the now standard desert camouflage uniforms from the Jordanian fighter pilot video. Multiple camera angles likewise capture the blood and gore in an intensely graphic fashion, ultimately showing a collective flow of blood flowing into a collective pool.

          The most recent Islamic State video, released on 19 April 2015, titled “Until There Came to Them Clear Evidence” is a 29 minute and 20 second video production in Arabic, but was published with the options of English, Russian, French, and German subtitles. The video opens with scripture from the Koran and Hadith describing the theological justification and subsequent requirements of Jizyah – the compulsion of taxation on those ‘People of the Book’, Jews and Christians, who choose to not convert to Islam. After a long introduction from one of Islamic State’s religious advisors, video testimony of non-Sunni Muslim denizens in Islamic State controlled testimony is shown. Those in the video begin to proclaim the fair and just practices of Islamic State and how their rule is more equitable than either the Syrian or Iraqi governments. The video extolls the virtue of the Islamic society built by the Islamic State. The consequences for failing to submit to the enforcement of Jizyah are shown by Islamic State fighters destroying Christian churches in the region with sledge hammers and vandalism. The conclusion of this video is purported to be in Libya and shows Christian prisoners lined up in front of a firing squad. The narrator frames the issue as “battle between faith and blasphemy, between truth and falsehood”.[38] The final scenes show two mass executions of 21 African Christians, half by firing squad and the other half by decapitation.

          Each video released by the Islamic State has its own unique message and substance while still adhering to a coherent message. The subject of each major video production is unique, but certain aspects are repeated throughout each video. The beginning of each video reads “Bismillah ir-Rahman ir-raheem”, Arabic for “In the name of God, the most gracious, the most merciful. Each video is also watermarked in a top corner with an animated Black Standard of the Islamic State flapping in the wind. The vernacular of foreign Islamic State fighters in the videos is a unique blend of their primary language, usually English or French, and Arabic phrases. The speakers in the video, whether foreign or from the Levant, most frequently punctuate their dialogue with “Inshallah”, Arabic for ‘God Willing’, “Wallahi”, Arabic for ‘Swear by God’, and “Alhamdulillah”, Arabic for ‘Praise be to God’.

The production efforts of Islamic State are intricate and detailed, which certainly translates in their video releases. Their cinematographic body of work shows clear improvement in multiple aspects, including scripted dialogue, choreography, quality of audio and video capture, costume design, body language, computer generated graphics, and overall production value. Islamic State and Al Hayat Media Center have successfully allocated qualified talent to relevant media production positions. The videos released by Islamic State are graphic in nature, but do not contain boring or disinteresting elements. Since their rise to prominence in the Summer months of 2014, Islamic State has been a permanent fixture in the Western media news cycle. Whether on television or imbedded on news websites, the video news reports feature heavy use of the videos published by Islamic State. Attention to detail and investment in media creation have bolstered the official image of Islamic State in the eyes of the general public, as well as those in the potential Islamic State fighter candidate pool.

American Military Recruiting and Social Media

          After the end of the first Iraq War, Operation Desert Storm, in 1991 the U.S. Armed Forces faced a recruiting slump and a declining enlistment in the nation’s all volunteer military. To combat the recruiting slump the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) commissioned a research assessment from the RAND Corporation. The 2001 RAND report on military recruiting assessed the current factors in declining recruitment and recommended that the DoD should “consider additional marketing strategies and enlistment options” to correct the issue.[39] In response, the DoD launched an aggressive television advertising campaign across the branches of the U.S., even enlisting the help of the major advertising firm Campbell-Ewald to help with recruiting messaging.[40] The new content created for recruiting demonstrated an increase and production value, the use of digital graphics, and directed messaging to the target recruiting pool. The classic motifs of “service or duty or patriotism or some potential long-term benefit” were minimized in favour of being “all about the experience” instead.[41] The shift in messaging and design, initiated by the 2001 aim to increase recruiting, has had a lasting effect through current military recruiting efforts.

          The U.S. Navy was the most conspicuous in regards to the call for increased recruitment advertising. Their “Accelerate You Life” campaign featured video clips that incorporated heavy metal music riffs, fast-cut editing, and a narrator asking the watcher “If someone wrote a book about your life, would anyone want to read it?”[42] The U.S. Army, the largest branch of the U.S. Armed Forces, also launched renewed efforts with their “Army of One” and, later, “Army Strong” advertising campaigns. After the outset of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) military recruiting campaign advertisements were a mainstay of American television. The latest iteration of a U.S. Armed Forces recruiting campaign is the U.S. Air Force’s “Aim High” messaging. The primary campaign video is a mix of thematic music, military footage of aircraft and soldiers, and narrated by compiled quotes of previous U.S. Presidents.[43] Through the maintained exposure of television broadcast, recruiting methods continued to evolve from the simple days of Uncle Sam posters and movie theater introductions. However, the U.S. Military still employs a multitude of conventional advertising channels including radio, print media – newspapers and magazines, and television commercials.

          The four largest branches of the U.S. Armed Forces, Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines, have quite an extensive social media presence. Coinciding with U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, from 2001 to 2014, was the rise of the internet and social media. During the height of these conflicts was when the U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines began their social media campaigns. After examining each branch’s official page on YouTube and Twitter, the key data points for their accounts analytics were compiled on 19 April 2015. The U.S. Army joined YouTube in March 2006, amassing 2,587,245 views over 780 videos with 19,460 subscribers; and later joining Twitter in September 2007, accumulating over 627,000 followers with 21,900 tweets.[44] [45] The U.S. Air Force joined YouTube in January 2008, amassing 9,554,804 views over 1,622 videos with 35,370 subscribers; and later joining Twitter in January 2009, accumulating over 407,000 followers with 25,900 tweets.[46] [47] The U.S. Navy joined YouTube in March 2006, amassing 29,478,673 views over 5,497 videos with 40,532 subscribers; and later joining Twitter in July 2009, accumulating over 463,000 followers with 18,200 tweets.[48] [49] The U.S. Marines joined YouTube in November 2005, amassing 21,015,729 views over 1,555 videos with 76,901 subscribers; and later joining Twitter in November 2007, accumulating over 537,000 followers with 10,800 tweets.[50] [51] In total, these four branches have garnered over 62,626,451 views over 9,454 videos with 172,263 subscribers on YouTube and over 2,034,000 followers with 76,800 tweets on Twitter. The reach of U.S. Armed Forces recruiting has grown exponentially with the advent of social media.

          The increased emphasis for the use of social media in communications and advertising has acted as a major catalyst in outreach and recruiting efforts. The common motifs of country, duty, patriotism, purpose, and experience are transmitted through electronic methods. The successful recruitment advertising campaigns of the U.S. Armed Forces have employed common thematic production styles and audio-visual elements since the redoubled efforts began after 2001. Scenes of battle, military imagery, regimental consociation, and impassioned background music are central components to the efficacy of U.S. Armed Forces recruiting media. Combined with the effects of the Internet and globalization, the recruiting media used by the U.S. Armed Forces has been viewed the world over.

Same Tactics, Different Intent

          The commonalities in recruiting efforts between the U.S. Armed Forces and the Islamic State are numerous. Coincidentally, the intent of recruiting in both organizations are also similar in nature on a main point: Islamic State’s campaign to recruit fighters to volunteer to leave their homes to fight on foreign soil mirrors the U.S. Armed Forces recruiting campaign to likewise find volunteers to leave their homes to fight on foreign soil. The presence of either group in the Levant has proven to be a causal mechanism for regional instability. Whether the scenario is the U.S. Armed Forces fighting against Islamic State or vice-versa, both bring about the arrival of foreign fighters to the region. Even the driving motivation for the individual fighting for their respective cause stems from the same alluring playbook of recruiting media production. The strategies employed by Islamic State communications outreach closely resembles, and even outright plagiarizes, the approaches and recruiting themes employed by the all-volunteer U.S. Armed Forces. Video media from either group contains four major components: 1) Military imagery, 2) Coherent narrative of duty, 3) Enlivening orchestral music, and 4) Quality production editing.

          Military imagery is the easiest component to capture. All videos released, from either party, neglect to show the absence of camouflage fatigues, even in the most minor of productions. Similarly, great measures are taken to show the might of each group’s respective hardware – for the U.S. Armed Forces that means a column of M-1 Abrams tanks and fly-bys of F-22 Raptors, while Islamic State features fleet vehicles of SUV’s and trucks with anti-aircraft guns mounted on the beds. Coherent narrative of duty can be a more nuanced task. For the U.S. Armed Forces, patriotism is an often easily aroused passion in the average American. Islamic State, a relatively new creation, has simultaneously bolstered its declared form as an autonomous and sovereign governing body, while literally destroying the history and ancient artifacts of the regions under their control.[52] Enlivening orchestral music is a subtler component, but can give the video a completely different mood. Humans involuntarily respond to music in wondrous ways. The ability to harness that pathway into the mind draws the observer closer in to the transmission. Lastly, major attention to the editing and overall quality is what differentiates between amateur footage and the appearance of a major media production. Quality of the finished product is integral to how viewers perceive the video’s message. The U.S. Armed Forces are able to go to some of the advertising industry’s best firms and invest in their own sophisticated media creation departments. Islamic State is a group constantly on the move, unable to operate in the realm of normal commerce. Nevertheless, both groups are able to record, edit, and produce major video works with proven track records in the effective recruiting. The ability of Islamic State to properly implement strict finishing standards is a vital catalyst for broadcasting their novel approach to state building.

          Social media efforts are of paramount importance to both groups, again, for related purposes. For disseminating information among current members as well as helping to raise morale within their ranks. The high quality video productions from both organizations are meaningless unless they reach their target audiences. Social media has been shown to cause gaffes in the public image of Islamic State, but also in the case of the U.S. Armed Forces. However, one of the features of social media called geotagging has presented a challenge for Islamic State, as users have accidentally revealed fighter locations and announced battle plans prematurely. As a result, the U.S. Armed Forces and their coalition allies have translated that data to use in kinetic sortie strikes on Islamic State targets in Syria and Iraq.[53] Despite the lack in low-level operational security, according to UN estimates, “the number of foreign fighters worldwide had soared by 71% between the middle of 2014 and March 2015” – the same period of time in which Islamic State aggressively used social media to release their video productions.[54]

          Islamic State influence in the Levant and the rest of the world will continue to grow until their recruiting efforts are brought to a halt. Reducing the ease of which a person can take-up arms for Islamic State alone will not cease the influx of foreign fighters. Domestic situations in a potential foreign fighter’s home country must also be improved reducing the chance that they would even want to leave home in the first place. Just as there is a large emphasis on counterterrorism in America and the Global North, so too should there be a more active counter-propaganda agency to combat the spread of Islamic State ideology via soft power methods. Granted, while soft power failed to destroy or degrade Islamic State in any measurable way during their rise to power, the key to reducing their charm and attraction to disenfranchised foreign nationals is by specifically combatting Islamic State recruiting messaging.[55] Social media has now become the latest weapon in the arsenal of asymmetrical warfare. Regardless of how Islamic State will eventually be brought down and held accountable for their atrocities, their unique recruiting campaign that was able to mobilize a wide array of willing fighters for a newly created cause will become a standard model for future extremist organizations.

The Failure of Soft Power to Destroy or Degrade the Islamic State

I wrote this analytical report for an assignment I had in 'PACS 605: Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding' for Professor Nathan Funk Ph.D, at Conrad Grebel University College, University of Waterloo during the Winter 2015 term. The outline for this assignment was a 7-9 page retrospective assessment of a yet unresolved conflict, analyzed in the context of class themes.

My analysis is not meant to be exhaustive, but is the first of three parts on the topic of The Islamic State for research assignments I have this term: 1) An Analysis of Promoting Peace in a Realist Conflict: Non-Violent Attempts to Destroy & Degrade The Islamic State (IS) - [A retrospective assessment of an unresolved conflict for PACS 605: Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding], 2) Investigating The Islamic State's Unprecedented Recruitment Efforts via Electronic and Social Media(s) - [Analyzing an emerging issue in the field of security studies for PACS 635 - Security Ontology: Issues And Institutions], 3) Formulating a peace-building strategy for conflict resolution in the retrospective assessment case study for PACS 605.

The use of soft power to destroy and degrade The Islamic State (IS/ISIS/ISIL) has failed to attain any measurable result. While the path to conflict cessation in Iraq and Syria might require the use of military force, the road to recovery and a lasting peace in the region ultimately demands the use of soft power and non-violent peacebuilding.

Please let me know what you think. All feedback is greatly appreciated.

-NK

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

An Analysis of Promoting Peace in a Realist Conflict:
Non-Violent Attempts to Destroy & Degrade The Islamic State (IS)

          Amidst the collapse of the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, a militant extremist jihadist group has emerged, seizing control of a large territory encompassing parts of Syria and Iraq. The group in question is known to the majority of the world as ISIL/ISIS - or Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Since their swift chain of military victories in 2013 and 2014, ISIL/ISIS has shortened their name to just the ‘Islamic State’ (IS). The brutal tactics of this Islamic extremist group embodies the Machiavellian principle that “it is much safer to be feared than loved, if one has to lack one of the two.”[1] The civilian death toll at the hands of IS has grown at an unprecedented rate, effectively “killing faster than statisticians can count.”[2] In 2014 alone IS was responsible for an estimated 21,000 to 47,000 deaths, civilian and combatant, continuing a trend of doubling year over year since 2012.[3]

          Although the military advance of IS across the Levant region have been nearly unimpeded, efforts have been launched to resolve the regional conflict outside the context of a military intervention. The UN has attempted to bring about conflict cessation through conflict mediators, regional forces such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan have used a mix of military and non-lethal support, and grassroots efforts have been deployed on a local level. This retrospective analysis of peace-promotion efforts will evaluate the attempts to bring about conflict cessation, without the use of overt hard power[4], in the context of IS aggression in the regions of Syria and Iraq. However, the historically inhospitable environments of Syria and Iraq, have and will, remain a substantial hindrance to cultural liberalization and the cessation of conflict.

The Rise of the Islamic State (IS)

          Known as the Syrian Uprising, the current conflict in Syria began in the spring of 2011 between pro-democracy protesters and the Syrian regime in the context of the Arab Spring.[5] The power vacuum left by U.S. forces and coalition troops after the withdrawal in neighbouring Iraq, in December 2011, enabled the influence of IS to proliferate in the ensuing chaos.[6] After the heavy military offensive IS launched in the summer of 2014, estimates suggest that the IS controlled territory in Iraq and Syria are roughly “equivalent to the size of neighbouring Jordan.”[7] IS has encountered hard power military resistance from three primary sources: Syrian Security Forces, the Iraqi Military, and the Kurdish Peshmerga. The Syrian Security Forces are engaged in a large-scale conflict nation wide and have not devoted full attention of force towards IS, leading to their capture of oil fields and large cities – such as the IS capital of al-Raqqa. The U.S.-backed and trained Iraqi military has largely crumbled under the advance of IS fighters, resulting in the capture of Mosul, an Iraqi city with the population of over 1 million residents.[8]

          Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is the self-declared Caliph of the Islamic State, encompassing the duties of military command, spiritual leadership, as well its public face. Al-Baghdadi is an Iraqi-born Salafist Sunni Muslim with a claimed PhD. in Islamic Studies with alleged ties of descendancy to the Prophet Mohamed’s Quraysh tribe.[9] Although IS began as an autonomous al-Qaeda affiliated group, in February 2014 “al-Qaeda’s central leadership announced that it had severed ties with ISIS” due to their excessively brutal and unforgiving tactics to Muslims and non-Muslims alike.[10] IS has employed unprecedented recruiting tactics across multiple social media platforms, drawing fighters from the Middle East and Western Nations alike. 2014 was a whirlwind year for IS, putting their force size at “an estimated 20,000 to 31,500 fighters in Iraq and Syria,” with fiscal assets, gained from looting and extortion, estimated to be around the “$2 billion (USD)” mark.[11] [12]

Tracking Soft Power Efforts for Conflict Cessation

          On 21 April 2012, the United Nations adopted UN Security Council Resolution 2043.[13] UNSC Resolution 2043 was not directed towards IS, but rather at the Syrian conflict as a whole, “reaffirming [the UN’s] support to the Joint Special Envoy for the United Nations and the League of Arab States.”[14] However, citing an “increasing militarization on the ground and the clear lack of unity in the Security Council,” Annan relinquished his role amidst the continuance of open hostilities between Syrian Security Forces and the rebel groups.[15] Following the departure of Kofi Annan, Lakhdar Brahimi assumed the role as Joint Special Representative, but still encountered the fatal roadblocks experienced by Annan.[16] Matching the instability of the Syrian environment, Brahimi likewise relinquished his position in the summer of 2014, resulting in the appointment of the current Joint Special Representative, Staffan de Mistura, in July of 2014.[17] The three Joint Special Representatives have been largely unsuccessful at implementing conflict cessation in Syria, with Syrian Security Forces and IS both ignoring any attempts for diplomatic peace-building efforts.

          Descending a step in the scale of approach, outside the context of the UN an anti-IS coalition was formed by upwards of 62 nations: 21 of the 62 nations have provided lethal military assistance, while 13 of the 62 nations have provided, exclusively, humanitarian support totaling over $100 (USD) in the form of medical supplies, blankets, and foodstuffs.[18] The conflict in the IS-controlled regions of Iraq and Syria has prevented an effective deployment of aid workers, whether foreign or domestic. In the cases where journalists and western aid workers did operate in Iraq and/or Syria, they were kidnapped, held as hostages for ransom, and ultimately executed. IS is indiscriminate in their targeting, repeating this macabre process regardless of nationality, religious affiliation, or gender.[19] While IS continues to repel outside intervention, in some instances, they have provided aid and public works to the denizens of their controlled territory, especially in areas hit hard by the Syrian regime.[20]

          The path that IS took when coming to power increasingly solidified their foothold in local arenas. Mimicking the Syrian regime’s brutal response to peaceful demonstrators, IS likewise erased any potential opposition by targeting local civic clubs, opposing religious sects, and private and public education institutions. Citing an extremist interpretation for the strict adherence to Islamic tenets, specifically that of shirk or idolatry, IS has destroyed cultural treasures and historic artifacts in an indiscriminate fashion.[21] Civil society organizations and grassroots movements often rely on existing social and civic infrastructure as a foundation for advocacy or activism. The tactics employed by IS demolished the already fragile social and civic infrastructure in regions IS now controls. As a result, the presence of organic local resistance to IS is practically nonexistent. One of the lone outliers of the non-violent anti-IS approach is the story of Suad Nofel, a female Muslim schoolteacher in the Syrian city of Raqqa.[22] Armed with only a cardboard sign and steadfast determination, “Nofel made her way to ISIS’s headquarters every day for three months” during the summer of 2013.[23] Despite her determined ethic, Nofel conceded that “unfortunately not enough people have joined my effort in resisting and that’s why [IS] grew stronger.”[24]

The Impasse of Unrestrained Aggression

          Nonviolent peacebuilding efforts implicitly rely on good faith measures from all parties involved. Prior to IS seizing control, the Syrian regime was the sole coercive force in the Syrian regions. Syrian Security Forces have similarly acted with impunity, dwarfing the IS death toll with an estimated 200,000 dead, for all of Syria, as of December 2014.[25] The failure of the UN Joint Special Representatives was a direct result of the Syrian regime’s unwillingness to reduce their military mobilization. In the Iraqi and Syrian territories now controlled by IS, IS forces are, at this moment, the sole coercive force directly present in a local capacity. As such, IS has one of the key principles behind the concept of state sovereignty. The continued trend for the failure of conflict cessation exists due to IS’s continuance of using brutal and violent tactics as a default response to all levels of opposition, whether local, Muslim, or otherwise. Even in the Iraqi and Syrian diaspora when the unification of displaced refugees has taken place, host nations have viewed the peaceful grassroots mobilization as a security issue.[26] Compounding the struggle to regional peacebuilding is the immense regional strain that exists from the continued accommodation of Palestinian refugees.

          Regardless of the theological legitimacy of IS’s claims to Islamic principles, they themselves are determined to endeavour by any and all means to both hold and increase their influence across the Levant. In the discourse that is regional conflict in the Middle East, the language IS has chosen is unrestrained violence. The attempts to counter IS influence in the region, whether that is by completely eradicating IS or just alleviating the suffering of those under IS control, have been met by fierce and immediate IS opposition. In this Realist, ‘might makes right’ landscape constructed by IS, peacebuilding tactics are not able to take hold, let alone flourish. Denizens of IS controlled regions have largely resulted to capitulation as a method of self-preservation when engaging with IS. Empowerment of local populations appears to be unattainable when just the act of survival is a daily struggle. The result of is an emboldened IS that does not envision an impending defeat, making the thought of negotiation highly improbable.

The Failure of Soft Power

          The use of soft power to combat the influence and advance of IS in Syria and Iraq has been met with increased barbarity and continued bloodshed. Relief efforts and non-lethal assistance have been delivered to the denizens of IS controlled territories in Syria and Iraq. However, the use of diplomacy, nonviolent peacebuilding, and humanitarian aid is a currency which IS refuses to trade in. The history of the violent totalitarian regimes have fostered the brutal environment in which IS now prospers. While popular uprisings, diplomatic measures, and cultural appeals perhaps worked, at least in part, with the previous regimes in attempts to liberalize or build peace, IS repeatedly greets these approaches with unrestrained violence – from summary executions to beheadings. The case study of IS represents the extreme end of a violent spectrum, resulting in the failure of soft power to bring about conflict cessation or even degrade IS control.

          The use of non-violent peace-building and soft power methods certainly has limits in this application, but they must not be forgotten. While conflict cessation or the reduction of IS control cannot be achieved by soft power or nonviolent methods of peacebuilding, the key to a lasting calm beyond the reign of IS certainly lies in these approaches. The absence of long-term conflict resolution approaches in Iraq, which bolstered the region’s instability after the American withdrawal in December 2011, is what created the environment in which IS proliferated. To make sure the continued pattern of short-sighted realism does not embark upon a successive cycle after the eventual defeat of IS, the methods previously forsaken must be applied.

Endnotes

1. P. 66, Machiavelli 1998
2. Schwartzstein 2014
3. Russia Today 2015
4. Hard Power is the use of economic sanctions or coercive military force from a top-down governmental approach. Ananian 2010
5. Rodgers, et al. 2014
6. The Associated Press 2011
7. VICE News 2014
8. United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) Human Rights Office 2014
9. BBC News 2014
10. Mendelsohn 2014
11. Yeginsu 2014
12. Chulov 2014
13. UN Security Council Resolution 2043, Syria 2012
14. Ibid.
15. Annan 2012
16. UN News Centre 2014
17. UN Secretary General 2014
18. Wordsworth 2014
19. Referring to the cases of non-combatants: aid workers David Haines (British), Alan Henning (British), Peter Kassig (American) and Kayla Mueller (American), journalists James Foley (American), Steven Sotloff (American), Haruna Yukawa (Japanese), and Kenji Goto (Japanese).
20. Croucher 2015
21. Arango 2014
22. Taleb 2014
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Taylor 2014
26. Montoya 2015


To see the full bibliography, follow this link:

Breaking Video Footage of the Israeli Air Strike in Syria

New footage has emerged from Syria, apparently showing the effects of an Israeli air strike that was conducted in the early hours of Sunday May 5th. This marks the second Israeli air strike in Syria in almost as many days, and is the third overall since the start of the Syrian Uprising.

While any perceived Israeli aggression in the region would usually entail major backlash from Arab countries, such has not been the case during the ongoing Syrian crisis. Although, Egypt and the Arab League have condemned this latest venture. Furthermore, these increased strikes would explain why Israel has repeatedly violated Lebanese airspace over the past few days.

All indications suggest that Hezbollah in Lebanon is not seeking any of Assad's chemical or biological weapons. However, Reuters is reporting that Hezbollah is actively seeking conventional weapons systems. Here is where the recent air strikes enter the frame.


The Israeli air strike targeted a shipment bound for Hezbollah, in the outskirts of Damascus. An American intelligence official told the New York Times that the "shipment consisted of Iranian-made Fateh-110s." An upgraded replacement for the aging supply of Soviet made Scuds in the Middle east, the Fateh-110's are a formidable new ground-to-ground missile weapons system. Intelligence reports suggest that if armed with the Fateh-110's, Hezbollah would be able to strike practically anywhere in Israel from Southern Lebanon.

In light of the recent chemical weapons developments, these air strikes by Israel on Syrian regime assets are currently the best, and really only, possible option in lieu of a direct intervention from the West. In my March interview with Dr. Joshua Landis, he speculated that "the [U.S.] military is also investigating whether Chem Weapons can be destroyed by bombing alone."

Interestingly, since Israel deems the threat of the Fateh-110's to be deserving of a direct strike, where does that leave the Syrian people? Assad has already demonstrated his readiness to use Scud missiles in civilian areas. Clearly, steps should be taken to prevent Assad from using the feared Fateh-110 on his own people.

Here's another angle of the massive fireball in Damascus.


Iran has already condemned Israel's actions and "urged countries in the region to stand against the assault."